Not Our Fight: The Roots and Forms of Anti-War Electoral Dissent in Civil War Wisconsin, 1860-1865 by Ciccone, Mark Anthony
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
May 2014
Not Our Fight: The Roots and Forms of Anti-War
Electoral Dissent in Civil War Wisconsin,
1860-1865
Mark Anthony Ciccone
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ciccone, Mark Anthony, "Not Our Fight: The Roots and Forms of Anti-War Electoral Dissent in Civil War Wisconsin, 1860-1865"
(2014). Theses and Dissertations. 673.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/673
 NOT OUR FIGHT: 
THE ROOTS AND FORMS OF ANTI-WAR ELECTORAL DISSENT IN 
CIVIL WAR WISCONSIN, 1860-1865 
 
by 
Mark Ciccone 
 
 
Master of Arts 
in History 
 
at 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
May 2014
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
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CIVIL WAR WISCONSIN, 1860-1865 
by 
Mark Ciccone 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor Lex Renda 
 
Although it has been discussed and examined at great length, the history of Civil 
War-era Wisconsin remains controversial in many ways. Though this state remained a 
loyal, integral part of the Northern bloc for the duration of this conflict, it was 
simultaneously divided deeply along political lines—Republican, Democratic, and the 
extreme wings of both parties—which brought about serious legislative and, at times, 
physical conflict between the parties and among their constituents over the nature of the 
state’s participation in the Civil War, and the war’s intended goals. And for the entirety 
of the war, there remained serious opposition on the part of many Wisconsin politicians, 
newspaper editors, and common citizens to the wartime and domestic policies of the 
Lincoln Administration.        
 The basis for this antagonism lay in the growing comprehension of the Civil 
War’s societal impact, exemplified by the measures taken by Lincoln and the 
Republicans to conduct it, and prepare for its long-term aftermath. As emancipation, 
conscription, and increased executive control of monetary and constitutional policy 
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became law, a significant number of Wisconsin voters—both immigrant and native-
born—came to regard these shifts as infringements upon their livelihoods, rights, and 
race, reversing their prior favorable views of the Republican Party’s economic and racial 
stances. Combined with newspaper reports of corruption in the army and Washington, 
and of appalling losses for little gain on the battlefields, these sentiments became the 
anchor for domestic dissent against the Republican Party in Wisconsin, and a recurring 
base of electoral support for the Democratic opposition for the duration of the war. In the 
end, Union success on the battlefield, and the continuous use of propaganda by the 
Republicans labeling their Democratic and grassroots opponents as traitors, became the 
deciding factors in maintaining the Republican dominance of Wisconsin offices and 
policies.          
 The key primary sources for examining this area of Wisconsin history are best 
found in the pronouncements from the Legislature and Governor’s office, official tallies 
of state referenda and elections, and the archives of the state’s markedly pro-Democrat 
and –Republican papers. Respectively, these reveal the efforts of the Republican-
dominated state leadership to maintain their wartime preeminence in the face of ever-
present criticism, illustrate the effect of these opinions upon the democratic process, and 
provide an excellent gauge of public and editorial opinion of state and national policy. 
 Though in the end unable to remove the ruling party and agenda of its time, the 
collective antiwar sentiments and actions of the Badger State’s citizenry proved a potent 
influence on state and national policy. This thesis is a narrative of one of the most 
contentious periods in Wisconsin history, and a telling example of the power of dissent in 
all its forms in Civil War America. 
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Prologue 
 
On the morning of November 10
th
, 1862, a crowd gathered outside the Ozaukee 
County courthouse in the town of Port Washington, Wisconsin. It was a notably diverse 
multitude: Irish, Germans, Poles, Luxembourgers and others from Central and Eastern 
Europe, most of them very recent immigrants to the “Badger State.” Many of these folk 
had come in flight from the chaos and economic uncertainty that had afflicted Europe 
intermittently since the fall of Napoleon, in the hopes of finding success in America. In 
the specific case of many Germans, they had escaped oppression and marginalization by 
the old regimes in the multiple states of their homeland, and sought to establish stable, 
prosperous lives in what they considered true democracy and freedom. To them, and 
those like them, America was the prime example of both.    
 Today, however, they were witness to a process which a majority of them had 
never expected to see in their new homeland, and to which they were ardently opposed. 
With the casualty lists from the Civil War—now in its second year—lengthening almost 
daily, the Republican-dominated state government, in accordance with decrees from the 
Lincoln administration in Washington, D.C., had officially announced the 
implementation of conscription measures for the state militia—and by extension, the 
Federal Army. It was no longer enough to simply call for volunteers, or to offer cash 
inducements to potential recruits; the demands of the war now required a draft of those 
considered fit for duty by the state, and by Washington. And with the losses widely 
printed in state newspapers, those liable for the draft were under few illusions as to what 
their likely fate would be if called to the colors.     
 When the commissioner for Ozaukee County emerged from the courthouse to 
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begin the draft lottery, there was a general low muttering of discontent. In the face of this, 
the commissioner set out the box of names from which the draftees would be randomly 
chosen. Shouts of “No Draft!” began to emanate from the crowd as the first names were 
called. Soon, more and more took up the call, while others began shouting and shoving 
forward in a confused mass of motion and noise.      
 Within a matter of seconds, the crowd began surging forward up the courthouse 
steps. Several men—possibly among those who expected call-up that day—tackled the 
draft commissioner and hurled him into the crowd, where he was kicked and stomped 
repeatedly until managing to break away and flee. While some of the crowd pursued him, 
the rest turned to the draft records. The lottery box was hacked to pieces, and the records 
burned on the spot. Unsatisfied, the mob went on to demonstrate their anger upon other 
locations, chanting “No Draft!” as they marched. At day’s end, eight homes, including 
the draft commissioner’s, had been gutted, with piles of wrecked furniture and other 
goods burning in the streets. By an apparent miracle, there were no reported deaths or 
serious injuries—apart from the luckless commissioner—and the mob dispersed by 
sundown, not to appear again.        
 The state’s response was swift. The following morning, Port Washington awoke 
to learn that six hundred troops had arrived to suppress any further outbreaks of dissent, 
and to enforce the draft. Over one hundred men confirmed as rioters were arrested and 
confined in military prison, and either tried, released—or drafted. Once the records were 
restored, the draft lottery proceeded smoothly, if tensely. Whatever the attitudes of those 
who later acquiesced to conscription, the demonstration of force had given them pause. 
And despite similar tensions elsewhere in the state—particularly in Milwaukee, just to 
the south of Port Washington—there were no further disruptions of the draft process. Yet 
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the threat of opposition, and of further violence, had been made vividly clear. 
 By itself, the riot at Port Washington was of limited scope, with little outward 
impact beyond its county and state once the troops were brought in. It was also to prove 
almost insignificant in comparison with later disturbances, such as the 1863 draft riots in 
New York City, in which more than a hundred were killed, and two thousand wounded—
the most destructive such disturbance in American history. Nonetheless, this incident 
exposed many of the social tensions in the state that had previously been manifested 
solely at the ballot box. The opposition Democrats would make a great deal of capital 
from such anger, using it to attack both the military and domestic policies of the Lincoln 
Administration and its backers and scoring electoral and popular gains for much of the 
war. And it served notice to the Republican Party, in both Wisconsin and across the 
North: Without coercion and popular appeals at home, subtle or overt, the Union could 
not expect to maintain its efforts at the front—which, conversely, required victories to 
maintain at-home popularity and give credence to any coercive tactics. These realizations 
would drastically influence the state’s politics and citizenry, and both divide and unite 
disparate factions within both major parties and among the voting populace for the 
remainder of the war.      
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Chapter 1 
First Disputes: Late 1860—Late 1861 
I. 
 “The actors in that remote little eddy of politics realized at the time that they were making history by that 
solitary tallow candle in the little white schoolhouse on the prairie.” 
--Alvan E. Bovay, on the inaugural meeting of the Republican Party (March 20th, 1854) 
 
The seeds of the Port Washington Riot, and of the broader antiwar sentiment in 
Wisconsin, were planted well before the first shots at Fort Sumter, well before Lincoln’s 
inauguration—even prior to Wisconsin’s entry into the Union. By the time of the 
Wisconsin Territory’s admittance as a state, the population stood above 300,000, and 
would expand to nearly 800,000 over the following decade. Overwhelmingly rural and 
farm-focused for much of this same period, the state also possessed rapidly growing 
urban centers (Milwaukee would reach 45,000 by 1860) and was steadily woven into the 
rail networks originating on the East Coast beginning in the early 1850s. In most respects, 
the state was still considered part of the western frontier—or at the very least a way 
station. Yet it was also rapidly gaining the nature and characteristics of other, more 
established states, particularly those of the North.     
 One such characteristic—steady, varied immigration—would play the most 
important role in shaping Wisconsin’s wartime politics. The first waves of white settlers 
had begun to arrive in the first decade of the 19
th
 century, hailing from New England and 
the central East Coast states—New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey—as part of the 
general land scramble in the Northwest Territory following the Revolutionary War. By 
the time statehood was granted, however, the arrivals now included vast numbers of 
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European immigrants, predominantly from the multiple German states and the Low 
Countries, as well as a significant influx of Irish, Scandinavians and Eastern Europeans. 
These groups had arrived primarily through New York City, the main port of immigrant 
influx, where they first encountered word of the lush farmland and growing cities that the 
Wisconsin territorial and later state legislatures were eager to advertise. Through the 
1850s, the southeastern counties of the state—Ozaukee, Milwaukee, Washington, and 
others—would be heavily settled by Germans and other Central Europeans, as either 
urban workers, merchants and artisans, or rural farmers. An estimated 50,000 Irish 
arrivals followed a similar course of settlement, while those from Eastern Europe and 
Scandinavia most often migrated further west, putting down roots in Dane and La Crosse 
counties in particular.
1
        
 This growth and prosperity, however, had been underscored by significant 
political and social concerns, both prior to and following statehood. In 1846, a 
constitutional convention had met to consider key points of such a document, and press 
for statehood that year. At the start of the convention, the majority of delegates (103) had 
declared themselves Democrats, though many had done so based upon their opinions on 
single issues rather than a common overall goal. The remaining 21 seats had been filled 
by Whigs and independents, neither of whom held significant popular appeal in the 
territory outside of the cities.
2
         
 Among the provisions debated had been debt exemptions for homesteaders, 
granting the franchise to foreign-born settlers, bank controls, and suffrage for free blacks. 
With Irish-born Milwaukee lawyer Edward G. Ryan as their most vociferous advocate, 
                                                          
1
 Rippley, La Vern J. The Immigrant Experience in Wisconsin  Twayne Publishers; Boston, Mass. 1985 p. 1-
28 
2
 Nesbit, Robert C. Wisconsin: A History The University of Wisconsin Press; Madison, WI 1973 p. 215-218 
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the Democrats objected to all of the above proposals—save for foreign enfranchisement, 
which Ryan and his supporters counted on to maintain Democratic prominence among 
German and Irish voters resentful of the nativist elements of the Whig Party. The banking 
issue was of greatest concern to the Democrats, who viewed any state support of such 
institutions as an unconstitutional favoring of capital over labor. Eventually, the 
Democratic-controlled committee created for this matter put forward severe restrictions 
on state banking—crafted solely by Ryan, who served as chairman—including rules 
barring the Legislature from authorizing or providing protections for banks in any form. 
These rules provoked a storm of criticism across the convention, from both the Whigs 
and the Democratic majority’s more conservative members, who feared they would 
extirpate all legal banking processes in Wisconsin rather than simply preventing 
government support. At the same time, to make any statements considered supportive of 
banks opened the speaker to denunciation as a tool of banking interests.
3
   
 Even after a more moderate banking clause, among other compromises, was 
finally decided upon, the quarrels over this and other clauses of the constitution—such as 
the homestead exemption—had caused the voting populace to quickly sour on the overall 
draft. When the formal vote was held in April of the following year, the constitution was 
soundly rejected, 20,333 to 14,119. This outcome demonstrated the impatience of the 
voters with party disputes, and also revealed the stance of Wisconsin’s differing ethnic 
populations. German-dominated counties, for example, had come out in strong support of 
the constitution, while those heavily populated by New England and other eastern settlers 
had staunchly opposed it. With such results in mind, the territorial government rapidly 
called a new convention in the winter of 1847, which took careful pains to avoid the 
                                                          
3
 Nesbit, p. 220--222 
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bureaucratic and party difficulties of the first. When the second draft was put to the voters 
in March of 1848, the original proposals had been watered down or partially excised. All 
banking legislation would be put to a general referendum before ratification; homestead 
exemptions were recommended for those with “a reasonable amount of property”; 
immigrant enfranchisement was confirmed, though without the stricter requirements 
prosed by conservative Democrats; and black suffrage was excised altogether. Although 
far fewer voters (22,591) participated in the second round, the result was overwhelmingly 
in favor of ratification. On May 29
th
, 1848, Wisconsin was formally designated the 30
th
 
state in the Union.
4
         
 As the 1850s opened, Wisconsin was drawn further into the steadily increasing 
tensions nationwide—particularly that of slavery. With the conclusion of the Mexican-
American War in 1848, the United States now controlled all the western lands from the 
49
th
 parallel to the Rio Grande, thus opening up tremendous opportunities for settlement. 
Under the 1820 Missouri Compromise, which had admitted that territory as a slave state 
yet barred slavery above the latitude 36-30, the expected delineation of free and slave 
territory at first appeared straightforward. But the increasing stridency of the New 
England-based abolition movement, in tandem with a series of acts passed under the 
Compromise of 1850—California’s admission as a free state; the option of “popular 
sovereignty” for the New Mexico and Utah Territories; and a much stronger Fugitive 
Slave Act, among others—as well as a general growing antipathy across the Northern 
states to the economic and political leverage enjoyed by the South, indicated that this 
accord was rapidly becoming unsatisfactory to both blocs.      
 When the Kansas-Nebraska Act—which proposed to allow voting under “popular 
                                                          
4
 Nesbit, p. 222--224 
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sovereignty” in the new territories to decide whether slavery would be codified in their 
future constitutions—was put forth at the start of 1854 by Democratic Senator and future 
presidential candidate Stephen Douglas, it was widely perceived as a de facto 
nullification of the Missouri Compromise. In Kansas Territory, widespread chaos erupted 
as pro-slavery “Border Ruffians,” operating out of Missouri, sought to swing the vote by 
fraudulent ballots, often attacking and murdering Free-Soil settlers in the process, and 
provoking a backlash of like violence. As a result, North-South relations deteriorated 
even further, and the Whigs and Democrats began to fracture along similar lines. By the 
end of 1854, the former party would be all but dissolved, and the latter would survive 
largely in name only, with adherence to the Union as the primary difference between 
delegates.           
 These developments had significant impact upon Wisconsin politics. In 1850, 
New York lawyer and teacher Alvan Bovay, a staunch Whig and opponent of slavery, 
had immigrated to the nascent Wisconsin town of Ripon. After two years of debate and 
sounding out the inhabitants of the growing community about their perceptions of the 
slavery question—which now eclipsed almost any other political concerns among the 
nation’s voting population—Bovay began to call for the formation of a party that would 
adopt unswaying opposition to slavery’s expansion, a platform many in the town and 
state were likely to support, even if abolition was still viewed with caution or open dislike 
by most Northerners.
5
         
 On February 28
th
, 1854, when the Kansas-Nebraska Act debates began in earnest, 
Bovay called a meeting of like-minded townspeople, during which they passed a 
                                                          
5
 Hasson, Charles K. “Alvan Earl Bovay: Reformer, Legislator, and Founder of the Republican Party” M.A. 
Thesis, 1985, p. 50 
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resolution declaring that if the bill were passed, they would “throw old party 
organizations to the winds, and organize a new party on the sole issue of slavery.” This 
bold statement, and the motivations behind it, were given further backing by other events 
in the state just over a week later. Under the strengthened terms of the Fugitive Slave Act, 
blacks were no longer guaranteed safe refuge in the Northern states upon fleeing 
Southern plantations, forcing them to continue on as far as British Canada. In addition, 
whites were not only prohibited from providing aid or shelter to runaways, but were also 
required to assist in their capture and return to their owners, who had the right to pursue 
them into any Northern state and seek redress in Northern courts. These provisions 
evoked great bitterness among many Wisconsinites, even those who were not ardent 
abolitionists, and led to considerations of direct action to halt any such returns.   
 Less than a month after the Ripon gathering, such action was taken. On March 
10
th
, a former slave named Joshua Glover, who had fled his Missouri owner two years 
previously and settled in Racine County, was tracked down and arrested by a posse of US 
Marshals led by his old master, and brought to a Milwaukee jail under warrant for return 
to St. Louis. Word of this arrest spread rapidly, angering abolitionists and less-ardent 
Free Soil citizens alike, and by the following day a crowd of Racine citizens had gathered 
in the town’s central square, where an ad hoc committee rapidly passed resolutions 
denouncing Glover’s arrest, demanding a fair trial, and declaring the Fugitive Slave Act 
unconstitutional. These declarations were then sent to a Milwaukee-area printer named 
Sherman M. Booth, a transplanted New Englander who had already established a 
reputation as an unwavering abolitionist. Upon determining that Glover was indeed 
imprisoned in the city, Booth began turning out handbills detailing the affair, having 
them posted throughout Milwaukee as he rode through the city streets calling for 
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sympathetic citizens to meet outside the courthouse—which destroyed any chance of 
Glover’s removal without public scrutiny, as his owner wished. By late afternoon, several 
thousand onlookers waited in the city square, many of them swayed by speeches from 
Booth and other abolitionists warning of future constitutional abuses they themselves 
faced if such arrests were allowed. When the federal marshals refused a writ of habeas 
corpus gained by the abolitionists and presented by the Milwaukee sheriff, the thoroughly 
inflamed crowd broke open the doors of the city jail, and escorted Glover out to the street 
en masse. Shortly thereafter, he was guided to Underground Railroad agents outside of 
the city, who would eventually bring him to Canada.
6
    
 This open defiance of the Fugitive Slave Act demonstrated the growing appeal of 
anti-slavery ideology in the newly-created state among both native-born and immigrant 
populations, as well as the unpopularity of the 1850 Compromise and the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. Even though outright calls for abolition were still viewed cautiously or 
critically by Yankee and European settlers alike, it was now plain that there was a 
burgeoning state-wide antagonism towards the “peculiar institution.” Indeed, while the 
federal marshals involved in Glover’s arrest were assured of their actions’ legality, the 
county and state sheriffs and police had stalled and equivocated throughout the affair, 
highlighting their own disapproval of the Fugitive Slave Act. Furthermore, when Booth 
was brought to trial in subsequent weeks for inciting Glover’s rescue, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court not only ordered him set free, but ruled the Fugitive Slave Act 
unconstitutional. Although Booth himself would spend the next several years appealing 
federally ordered imprisonment, Wisconsin’s courts and political leadership had made 
                                                          
6
 Baker, Robert H. The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the 
Civil War  Ohio University Press; Athens, OH 2006, p. 1-23 
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their stance clear as well.        
 Celebration over Glover’s liberation was marred when it became clear in the last 
week of March that Congress, after much acrimonious debate among the varying factions 
of Democrats and Whigs, intended to pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Therefore, on the 
night of March 20
th
, Alvan Bovay called another meeting of his friends and allies in 
Ripon, to gather in the town’s schoolhouse. Upon gathering, Bovay later asserted, “we 
went in Whigs, Free-Soilers, and Democrats; we came out Republicans, and we were the 
first Republicans in the Union.
7”       
 From its beginning, the new Republican Party enjoyed substantial yet cautious 
backing among many of Wisconsin’s citizens. As Bovay had pledged, the cornerstone of 
the party’s policy was opposition to slavery and its expansion, an ambition that by this 
time was associated primarily with the Southern branch of the Democrats. By the time of 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, support for such opposition could be counted on from elements 
of the German immigrant population and others descended from Central and Eastern 
Europe, especially among the so-called “Forty-Eighters”—reform-minded individuals 
and groups who had fled the collapse and repression of the 1848 liberal revolutions in 
Germany, Austria and elsewhere, and were thus inclined to join with a party that 
advocated the checking of what they perceived as a reactionary power in the South. Not a 
small number of these supporters also backed or participated in Sherman Booth’s actions 
in Milwaukee, and avidly followed the open calls for abolition in his newspaper, the 
Wisconsin Free Democrat.         
 However, this show of support, while impressive, was not universal. While 
sympathetic to the idea of halting slavery’s encroachment through legal means in the 
                                                          
7
 Hasson, p. 60 
12 
 
  
territories and the North states, the majority of Germans in Wisconsin, as well as of the 
Irish and other immigrant citizens, did not support abolition. If slavery were done away 
with altogether, they believed, the resulting free population of blacks would inevitably 
depress wages and living standards for whites everywhere due to their cheaper labor, 
bringing on unwanted competition at best, and widespread unemployment at worst.
8
 In 
addition, there were apprehensions on the part of Irish and German Catholics that the 
ranks of the Republicans included nativists and others who had not defected to the fringe 
Know-Nothing Party, and would therefore turn the new party towards attacks on foreign-
born and Catholic settlers—possibly with abolition as a tool towards such ends.   
 During the later state elections in 1857, this latter charge appeared verifiable, 
when a referendum proposing suffrage for the several hundred blacks then living within 
the state was put forward, building on a similar defeated proposal  from 1849. As the 
campaign progressed, German language papers such as the Milwaukee Banner und 
Volksfreund, and the Democratic Milwaukee News, asserted that the Republicans sought 
to disenfranchise all foreign-born voters upon assuming power, and confer such rights 
upon blacks.
9
 These concerns were to become frequent hurdles for Republicans when 
campaigning among immigrant constituencies in coming elections, and an oft-used issue 
for the Democrats.        
 Nevertheless, the Republicans’ initial efforts proved promising, in Wisconsin and 
across the North. A significant coup was the addition of one of the most popular “Forty-
Eighters,” Carl Schurz. A former Prussian army officer, Schurz had arrived in Wisconsin 
just over a year after the meetings in Ripon, after having fled the suppression of 
                                                          
8
 Klement, Frank L. “Catholics as Copperheads during the Civil War,” p. 36 
9
 Current, Richard N. (ed. William F. Thompson) The History of Wisconsin (Vol. 2) The Civil War Era, 1848-
1873  State Historical Society of Wisconsin; Madison, WI 1976 p. 265 
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revolutions in the German states of Baden and the Palatinate, in which he had played a 
prominent role. Settling in Watertown, he had been attracted to the anti-slavery 
movement, and its new ally in the Republicans. Though he would not attain political 
office in the prewar period, Schurz would prove an outstanding party advocate. During 
the Wisconsin and national elections of the later 1850s Schurz traveled and spoke to 
multiple predominantly German-American settlements and locales through Wisconsin 
and the North—often doing so in his birth language, which was widely credited with 
raising Republican popularity among these voters, and discrediting accusations of 
nativism in its rhetoric and membership.
10
        
 In 1860, he was chosen as spokesman for the Wisconsin delegation to the 
Republican National Convention, eventually chairing the committee which announced 
Lincoln’s candidacy—despite having favored William Seward—and later replicated his 
speaking tours and tactics during the Presidential campaign. Such party loyalty would be 
rewarded at the outbreak of war the following year, when Schurz, after a brief tenure as 
ambassador to Spain, gained a commission as a brigadier general, a post he would hold 
for the duration of the war. Though his own claims of having fostered the Republican 
successes among the German populations in Wisconsin would prove false or overly 
aggrandizing, his presence and skills nonetheless aided in debunking, or at least 
assuaging, fears of nativism among the foreign-born settlers of the Badger State.   
 By the start of 1856, the Whigs and the Democrats had effectively broken along 
sectional lines. While the Southern wing of the latter party controlled much of the federal 
government, and would count on sympathy from Northerner James Buchanan upon his 
becoming President, the Northern members were either throwing their support to 
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 Trefousse, Hans L. Carl Schurz: A Biography Fordham University Press; New York, 1998, p. 86-90 
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moderate Stephen Douglas, or leaving the party altogether. The Whigs, meanwhile, had 
already splintered into similar factions after the Democratic victory in 1852. These 
divisions now widened even more as their Southern delegates—the majority of whom 
had generally favored the Kansas-Nebraska Act, putting them at further odds with the rest 
of the party—renounced their membership, with some joining former Whig President 
Millard Fillmore’s American Party during the 1856 elections, or eventually becoming 
part of the short-lived Constitutional Union Party under John Bell. The Northern Whigs, 
who as a whole favored strong national economic and industrial growth but had little use 
for the slavery debate beyond curtailing the enlargement of Southern influence, broke 
apart in like ways before and during 1856. Some delegates added to the ranks of the 
Know-Nothing Party, and others—including Abraham Lincoln—abandoned politics 
altogether. Overall, there was little appearance of party unity in either of the two bodies 
that had controlled the American political system since the start of the Jacksonian era 
some thirty years prior.         
 During this same period, the preponderance of Northern departures from both 
parties flocked to the Republicans. These men, in accordance with Bovay’s observation, 
consisted of Free-Soilers disgusted with the Kansas-Nebraska Act, modernizing Whigs 
opposed to the dominance of the agrarian Southern planter class, and abolitionists 
seeking to not only halt slavery’s expansion, but end its existence throughout the nation. 
While these groups were in some ways opposed to one another on specific ideological 
grounds—anti-slavery rhetoric and the notion of black civil rights, for example, would 
not gain a wide following in the nascent party until the waning of the Civil War—their 
common anger at the influence of the South served as a crucial unifying factor, as did 
their devotion to the national Union over the mostly Southern-dominated adherence to 
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state’s rights. When set against the Democrats, who were still cripplingly riven along 
North-South lines, the likelihood of important Republican gains was increasingly strong. 
 The 1856 national elections were, in effect, the final nail in the coffin of hopes for 
a unified Democratic Party, and a trial run for the Presidency on the part of the 
Republicans. The latter body chose to run noted explorer and soldier John C. Fremont for 
the Presidency, under the slogan of “Free Labor, Free Land, and Free Men,” which 
encapsulated the Republican favoring of small independent workers as opposed to slave 
labor, of widely available small homesteads as opposed to the vast private holdings of 
slave-owners, and of the containment of slavery as it was presently bounded, in the hopes 
that its eventual collapse would lead to complete freedom for all Americans—though 
explicitly avoiding calls for emancipation. In the face of these increasingly popular 
provisions, the Democrats chose to run James Buchanan, who as a “doughface”—a 
Northern candidate whose loyalties and base of support lay in the South—could hold this 
region within the party, maintain the impression of internal unity, and exalt compromise 
and defense of the Constitution and Union as it then existed, in the face of Republican 
ideology threatening to destroy both. This platform, combined with rumors attacking 
Fremont’s alleged Catholicism and the remaining independent Whigs’ attempt to remain 
in the political discourse through Fillmore’s American Party, led to a Buchanan victory 
that November.         
 However, the show of Republican support in the North (114 electoral votes, 
including Ohio, New York and all of New England, to Buchanan’s 174) proved this party 
had become a serious and popular challenge to the conciliatory stance of the Democrats. 
Furthermore, the choice of Buchanan and of his Southern vice-president John C. 
Breckinridge had alienated much of the moderate wing of this party, which came to rally 
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around Stephen Douglas as their main voice. Given his “Manifest Destiny”-influenced 
view of railroads and western expansion, as well as his devotion to Union—which were 
of like importance to elements of the Republican Party—Douglas at first glance appeared 
a somewhat unusual pick for such a leadership role. The key differences lay in the 
Republican’s emphasis on denying slavery’s expansion westward by any means, as 
opposed to Douglas’s embrace of “popular sovereignty” and his belief that any federal 
constraints on the “peculiar institution” were undemocratic—the latter another source of 
contention between himself and Buchanan. As the nation began apprehensively moving 
toward the 1860 elections, Buchanan was increasingly becoming a President without a 
party, while his followers rallied to the “Little Giant” and the overall national discourse 
became much more polarized.        
 In Wisconsin itself, the debates, divisions and elections of 1855 and 1856 had 
resulted in significant gains for the Republicans, and delivered the state’s electoral votes 
to the national candidate, John C. Fremont.
11
 Assemblyman Coles Bashford won the 
governorship—the first Republican to do so in Wisconsin history—and three Republican 
congressmen were seated, as well as two Senators; a slew of seats in the Legislature were 
also won by this party.
12
 In a telling example of tensions rife at the time, William 
Barstow, the Democratic incumbent, had initially claimed the governorship by a mere 
157 votes, but an investigation found this slim lead fraudulent. After having at first 
vowed to remain regardless of Bashford’s swearing-in by the state Supreme Court on 
January 7
th
, 1856—the same day Barstow was publicly re-inaugurated—the Democrat 
was finally forced to resign in March. A four-day attempt by his technically legitimate 
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successor, Lt. Governor Arthur MacArthur, to hold the office for the Democrats was 
ended when Bashford arrived in Madison, with the threat of force to ensure his 
establishment as Governor.         
 The following year, Bashford declined to run again, having been charged with 
bribery in dealings with state railroad companies, and a growing perception of nativist 
support for his administration, which both parties sought to avoid in order to win the 
foreign-born vote. Another New York transplant, Alexander Randall, thus rose to the 
governorship on the Republican ticket. Arriving in the state in 1840, Randall had soon 
become involved in the Free Soil wing of the Democratic Party, where he frequently 
pressed the issue of black suffrage in the Territorial government and the constitutional 
convention of 1846. Elected to the Assembly in 1855, he had been among the first 
delegates to defect to the Republican Party, along with considerable numbers of his 
fellow Free-Soil men and discontented Northern Whigs.
13
 His election as governor, albeit 
closer than expected—he gained the governorship, but Carl Schurz, his running-mate for 
lieutenant-governor, had been defeated—underscored the growing success of the 
Republicans at the state and local levels. With his striking manner of rhetoric, and adroit 
politicking, Randall would prove an able state leader through the months of the Secession 
Crisis, and the first year of the Civil War.      
 As the last years of the 1850s unfolded, the national situation deteriorated even 
further. In early 1857, the Supreme Court, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, ruled that blacks, 
free or slave, could not be citizens, that a slave brought into free territory by his master—
as Scott had been—could not sue for his freedom, and, most crucially, that the federal 
government had no authority to regulate slavery in the territories added to the United 
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States since independence. This ruling thus declared the Missouri Compromise invalid, 
dealing another crippling blow to national unity—and to Democrats’ hopes of 
maintaining regional and internal unity. The Republicans’ hand was made stronger yet by 
President Buchanan’s endorsement of the Court’s decision, and his vacillation in 
confronting the general crisis.        
 In Wisconsin, this shift in popular opinion came about through both impatience 
with perceived federal kowtowing to the proslavery faction, and deep fears regarding the 
state’s economic stability. Over the spring and summer of 1857, banks and companies 
across the nation had been failing at a steady pace, causing rapid declines in specie 
deposits, banknote values and crop prices. This in turn led to widespread bankruptcy 
among rural farmers, as land values dropped and loans dried up, and recurring violence 
against state and banking officials who came to foreclose on farming mortgages.
14
 
Though the panic had largely abated nationwide by 1859, Wisconsin and the other Great 
Lakes states remained mired in banking, commodities and land value doldrums, 
illustrating the difficulties that the western states and territories faced—which would only 
be worsened by the competition and uncertainty resulting from the Dred Scott decision. 
These concerns, combined with resentment towards the plantation South for having 
emerged practically unscathed from the panic, were reflected in Randall’s reelection to a 
second two-year term that same year, and the further expansion of the Republican 
presence in the Legislature. Not willing to concede Wisconsin or the nation, the Northern 
Democrats continued to defect in droves to Stephen Douglas, while their Southern 
colleagues began to consider other means—whether a wholly separate party, or out-and-
out secession—by which they could defend what they viewed as their constitutional 
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rights to slavery and state power over that of Washington.     
 Having defeated the Republican’s rising star, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1858 race 
for the Illinois Senate seat after a series of grueling debates, Douglas was now considered 
the ideal Democratic choice for the Presidency in 1860, primarily by the northern wing of 
his party, a view which was soon made more apparent by Buchanan’s refusal to run for a 
second term. When the 1860 Democratic National Convention opened that April—
prophetically, in Charleston, South Carolina—the Wisconsin Democrats joined together 
in supporting Douglas’s nomination, in spite of his lack of a substantial platform beyond 
the slavery question. The choice of this state’s delegates reflects the progressively 
desperate calls for maintaining the Union regardless of party or regional splits, and the 
paralysis of the Democrats nationwide.        
 These problems were further amplified by the ultimate outcome of the 
Convention. Although Douglas was finally chosen as the candidate for the main body of 
the Democrats, this was only done after the Southern wing—led by Vice-President and 
future Confederate general John C. Breckinridge—had broken with the pro-Douglas 
delegates over his refusal to endorse the creation of a federal code allowing and 
protecting slavery everywhere in the Union, which the Wisconsin delegates in particular 
knew was a non-starter for a growing number of voters in their state. When the 
convention reconvened two months later in Baltimore, Douglas was nominated with 
virtually all-Northern support. Breckinridge by this time had been put forward as a 
candidate by the now-distinct Southern Democrat Party, on a platform exalting state’s 
rights—including slavery and the legality of secession. A handful of remaining Whigs 
and moderate Southern Democrats formed a fourth body, the Constitutional Union Party, 
around Tennessee Senator John Bell, with the central argument that as slavery was 
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constitutionally protected, there was no need for and no right of the South to break from 
the Union. For all intents and purposes, the Democrats had broken their party over the 
slavery question.        
 Hampered by the divisions of the Convention, the Wisconsin delegates returned 
home to stump for Douglas. In addition, though it was considered unseemly for anyone 
seeking the highest office to stump for himself, this did not stop Stephen Douglas from 
doing so in Milwaukee and other locations as the Democratic candidate traveled through 
both North and South attempting to re-unite his sundered party. His campaign messages, 
duplicated by the Wisconsinites, sought to placate both Unionist and pro-secession voters 
by attacking disunion and abolitionism, pleading the case for Union above all, and 
attacking any speakers or rhetoric that sought to press the slavery issue or the authority of 
state governments as opposed to that of Washington. The past charge of Republican ranks 
including Know-Nothing and other nativist candidates was also resurrected for this 
campaign, in the hopes of maintaining traditional Democratic strongholds among Irish 
and German Catholic voters, as was the unpopular prohibition plank used in previous 
Republican platforms. In short, the Democrats hoped to avoid the most glaring issues of 
the campaign with calls for general harmony, attacks on presumed Republican nativism, 
and warnings of racial violence and national crisis if the their opponents gained 
Washington.          
 Even more than the division between their Southern and Northern wings, these 
tactics reflected the Democrats’ lack of a real platform in 1860, and the level of 
disconnect between their leadership and their constituents. Though Wisconsin had 
entered the Union twelve years prior as a largely Democratic state, the party’s 
increasingly inflexible positions on banks, railroads and other key elements of western 
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development, in tandem with its growing association with the “Slave Power,” was 
eroding its bases of support.          
 The Republicans, meanwhile, were gaining a wider and stronger following as the 
campaign progressed. For a plurality of voters, the most important plank in the national 
Republican platform was the promise of a homestead bill, by which any family could 
gain 160 acres at no cost simply by staking a claim in the still-largely wilderness 
territories—such as northern Wisconsin. Through this program, the Wisconsin 
Republicans hoped to not only attract further settlement, but to establish the small 
landholder economy demanded by the free-labor principles inherited from the Whigs and 
reshaped since in opposition to the South’s plantation economy. Furthermore, in a 
departure from their ardent initial stance of the 1850s, the Republican Party began to garb 
their anti-slavery position with the rhetoric of colonization. Stressing the importance of 
free white labor, key Republican candidates—such as Senator James Doolittle—espoused 
the notion of blacks, freed or enslaved, departing the United States for Africa, thus 
ending slavery and avoiding sectional or racial conflict, in one fell swoop.
15
 In this 
manner, the Republicans sought to deny Democratic claims that abolition and black 
equality held sway over their party’s platform, and also attract voters fearful of the 
disunion and economic catastrophe that would result from the Secession Crisis. 
 While there were concerns within the party over the effectiveness of the 
Democrats’ Know-Nothing and prohibition charges among the state’s immigrants, the 
Republicans nonetheless believed that Lincoln’s image—that of the homespun, self-made 
westerner—combined with the North’s growing impatience with the Democrats’ apparent 
fawning over the Southern states, would grant them victory. As the campaign wound 
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down, this impression had become increasingly accepted even by most Wisconsin 
Democrats. Their party had already provided an example in miniature of secession’s 
impact on the American system, their onetime Southern colleagues were mounting 
independent national campaigns which were draining away border and Deep South votes 
from their presidential candidate, and their chief opponents in the Republicans were 
putting forth a platform—halting slavery, stronger infrastructure and free land—that had 
captured much of the voting populace’s minds.  With November 4th approaching, the 
chief concern of the Democrats was determining how poorly their candidate and party 
would fare, and how best to minimize the damage. 
II. 
“The disunion sentiments avowed in portions of the country, and sometimes in our Halls of National 
Legislation, are unpatriotic, undignified, disgraceful. Every threat of disunion should be held up to public 
reprobation in all sections of the Union, and every attempt at disunion be rewarded with a halter. The 
Union of these states cannot be dissolved.” 
--Governor Alexander Randall, Jan. 12, 1860 
 
When the final results of the November 6 elections became known, Republicans 
in Wisconsin had much reason to celebrate. Building on their gains over the past six 
years, they had won majorities in forty-six of the state’s fifty-seven counties, 
strengthened their hand considerably in the Legislature, and joined the majority of 
northern states that had chosen Abraham Lincoln in the national election. Despite the 
Presidential candidate’s absence from the state for the entirety of the campaign, and 
initial divisions among the state delegates over the nominations of Seward and Hamlin, 
the still-nascent party now had their man in the White House, and a comfortable hold on 
the reins of power in Wisconsin.        
 These victories masked a number of concerns, however, which would manifest 
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themselves as the crisis and war worsened. Lincoln had carried the state by a comfortable 
majority in the four-way race that was 1860 (86,110 to Douglas’s 65,021; John Bell and 
John Breckinridge tallied 889 and 151, respectively), but the Democrats had retained 
their control of the city and county of Milwaukee, and drawn high support in Ozaukee 
and Washington Counties, to name only two.
16
 Also, Carl Schurz’s energetic speaking 
tours and other electioneering tactics had produced mixed results at best. The German-
American and Irish voters, concentrated primarily in the abovementioned counties and 
towns, had voted heavily Democratic—even to the point of carrying Watertown, Schurz’s 
hometown, 452 to  271)—while those of native-born American descent had favored 
Lincoln.
17
 Even the German vote itself had been notably divided: Those of the Catholic 
faith, in tandem with their counterparts from the Low Countries, cast their lot with 
Douglas, while the Protestants and ardent revolutionary “Forty-Eighters”—secular, 
liberal-minded men cast in Schurz’s mold—chose the Republican ticket.18 This indicated 
that the Democrats’ rhetoric proclaiming Republicans as dyed-in-the-wool anti-foreigners 
had struck a chord with a sizeable portion of the Wisconsin immigrant electorate. These 
voters had shown their favor towards the Republican homestead plank, as well as toward 
the calls for banning slavery in the new western territories, but had rejected this party for 
its Whig and nativist past, demonstrating the Democratic bent of much of the state’s 
population even in the wake of the divisions at Charleston and Baltimore.   
 In the initial days following the election, a tense calm prevailed. Outside the 
political and editorial circles of the state, few citizens believed or hoped civil war would 
come; threats of secession had been made across the South both before and after the 
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campaign had started, but as yet none had been pursued, and it was hoped they would be 
set aside in the interest of compromise. A common warning in Democratic speeches on 
the trail had been that a Lincoln and Republican victory would in effect be a casus belli, 
but there was no immediate sign of hostile intent, from either North or South, giving 
further credence to peace-minded impressions.     
 The first of these hopes would be dispelled within weeks. On December 17
th
, 
1860, after its election eleven days prior, delegates of a “secession convention” in South 
Carolina formally took their seats. This was followed by the announcement of similar 
elections in Mississippi and Alabama, with conventions set for January 7
th
, and word of 
yet more such machinations in the other Lower South states. Sensing the level of anxiety 
and concern statewide, Governor Randall, having already made his stance on secession 
clear in his 1859 inaugural, now chose to use it to turn public opinion his way, and 
towards support for stronger national measures aimed at ensuring the Union’s stability.  
 His first act in this regard came on January 10
th
, 1861, as the Legislature sat for its 
joint opening session. After a detailed description of the number and quality of state 
militia believed available for Federal service (nearly 130,000 in all), Randall launched 
into a passionate oration on slavery, disunion, and Wisconsin’s intended role in 
combatting both. Harking as far back as the Founders’ first efforts at American unity with 
the Articles of Confederation, he declared that the “General Government” created under 
the Constitution “was intended to be perpetual, and no plan or device was suggested or 
conceived whereby it could be destroyed.
19” The withdrawal of South Carolina, and the 
anticipated like actions of the other states constituting the “Slave Power,” was therefore 
illegal: “A state cannot come into the Union when it pleases, and go out when it pleases.” 
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Randall then gave a stark, succinct statement of his own views on the crisis—“Secession 
is revolution; revolution is war; war against the government of the United States is 
treason”—and closed with a vivid summation of the crisis, and of his state’s intended 
course in it: 
“The hopes of civilization and Christianity are suspended now upon the answer to 
this question of dissolution. The capacity for, as well as the right of self-government is to 
pass its ordeal, and speculation to become certainty. Other systems have been tried and 
have failed, and all along the skeletons of nations have been strewn, as warnings and 
landmarks upon the great highway of historic government. Wisconsin is true, and her 
people steadfast. She will not destroy the Union, nor consent that it shall be done. 
Devised by great, and wise, and good men, in days of sore trial, it must stand. Like some 
bold mountain, at whose base the great seas break their angry floods, and around whose 
summit the thunders of a thousand hurricanes have rattled, strong, unmoved, 
immovable—so may our Union be, while treason surges at its base, and passions rage 
around it, unmoved, immovable—here let it stand forever.20” 
 
This was not to say there would be no further attempts at compromise, as many 
citizens still hoped both in and beyond Wisconsin. But with rhetoric such as Randall’s 
becoming commonplace among both anti- and pro-secessionists, and both North and 
South beginning to amass men and materiel for war, such efforts would prove fruitless. 
When the last serious endeavor—the Crittenden Compromise—was brought forth as a 
package of constitutional amendments in Congressional committee on February 4
th
, 
Wisconsin Congressman Cadwallader Washburn and Senator James Doolittle joined their 
Republican colleagues in nullifying it in the belief that it yielded too much to the South 
short of independence, highlighting the clause requiring their party to withdraw its 
opposition to slavery’s expansion westward as the most galling concession. Ironically, 
the two Wisconsin delegates were also joined in opposition to the eleventh-hour proposal 
by their ardently secessionist colleagues, who no longer believed compromise was a 
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viable option. While Doolittle himself proposed an alternate amendment specifically 
forbidding secession, Washburn called upon his House associates to reject any future 
compromises such as Crittenden’s, and to stand firm against the burgeoning rebellion: 
“Let us have disunion and, if need be, civil war rather than dishonor.21” Largely thanks to 
such sentiments, a call from the Virginia legislature for a national peace convention in 
late February was likewise rebuffed, after considerable debate and indecision. Wisconsin 
Democrats wished to send representatives, but feared they would be selected with the 
intent to reject compromise altogether, while the Republicans either sought to send such 
delegates, or declared that none should be sent at all.     
 Following Lincoln’s inauguration on March 4th, 1861, Wisconsin’s parties and 
citizens remained on alert, avidly following the continuing crisis. By this time, 
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had joined South Carolina 
in secession, and former US Senator Jefferson Davis had been sworn in as President of 
the newly-declared Confederate States of America, with Montgomery as its capital. Yet 
for the first several weeks of his administration, Lincoln appeared neutral, even 
conciliatory, towards the Secession crisis, deliberately avoiding any speeches or orders—
such as ordering reinforcements or a rescue operation to the besieged garrison at Fort 
Sumter—that risked inflaming the situation.22 In light of this, and the increasing 
likelihood of violence as necessary to restore the Union after the failure of the Virginia 
invitation, an attitude of moderation had begun to temporarily proliferate through 
Wisconsin’s citizenry and parties. Papers in Milwaukee and other towns decried the idea 
of the federal government forcing states to remain part of the Union, declaring that not 
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only did the right to do so not exist, but that it was ultimately impossible to achieve, and 
detrimental to the entire idea of democracy. Morton “Brick” Pomeroy, editor of the La 
Crosse Democrat, who had previously denied the right of secession, now asserted that 
South Carolina had done so “for her own protection,” and that coercion to restore the 
Union was “dangerous, impractical, and impossible.23”     
 The word of Fort Sumter’s surrender sharply reversed this trend. As reports of the 
bombardment and yielding of the fort circulated, shock and rage among both parties and 
all citizens was quickly transformed into a tidal wave of patriotic fervor. Public war 
meetings of citizens affirming loyalty to the Union and demanding revenge for Sumter 
were held in Milwaukee, Madison, and numerous other cities, regardless of party 
strength. The Democratic members of the Legislature, and the party leadership as a 
whole, likewise endorsed and espoused this manner of oratory, pledging to support the 
Union’s nascent war effort to the hilt—literally in some instances, as offers to serve in 
whatever units were called to the colors attested. Before the end of summer, however, the 
two parties and their supporters would begin to duel once again over the state’s role in the 
burgeoning civil war—with both words and violence. 
III. 
“Rebellion and treason are abroad in our land…We know where this commenced and we know 
where it must end…Charleston should be razed till not one stone is left atop another, till there is no place 
for the owl to hoot nor the bittern to mourn. Had I the power of the thunderbolts of Jove, I would wipe out 
not only traitors but the seeds of traitors.” 
--Gov. Randall, May 3
rd
, 1861 
 
When Governor Randall received President Lincoln’s April 14th call for 75,000 
three-month troops to end the rebellion, he took two immediate steps. The first was a 
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general call to all “patriotic citizens,” asking them to report for duty after they had 
formed into companies ready to be mustered into service. Next, he called on the 
Legislature to equip Wisconsin’s expected contribution—one regiment at this time, 
roughly 800 men and officers—and to vote funds for the state’s general war effort. 
 Randall knew, however, that the level of energetic patriotism in his state meant 
that Wisconsin’s quota would be filled in a single day; indeed, the entire nationwide call 
could likely be met from the Badger State alone, as was proving the case in Ohio and 
other states in the Union. When, after multiple entreaties to Secretary of War Simon 
Cameron asking to send two more regiments—and even to increase the national call-up 
to 100,000, for three years rather than three months—Randall instead received word that 
he should cease recruiting altogether, he chose to ignore this advice. After seeing the First 
Wisconsin Volunteer Regiment off to Washington with great fanfare on April 22
nd
, he at 
once began overseeing the creation of six more regiments, gathered at the recruitment 
camp outside Madison which soon bore his name.      
 As yet, opposition to the military aspect of the war effort, either from the 
Democrats and their press allies, or from the general public, had been lukewarm or 
nonexistent. With the Southerners perceived as having fired the first shots, citizens 
statewide had set aside their previous convictions, and embraced calls for unity and 
defense of the nation. Senator Doolittle provided an eloquent summation of this 
collaboration: “Wisconsin speaks with one voice today…From town and hamlet, from 
native and foreign-born, from old and young, from Republican and Democrat, there 
comes but one response, ‘The Constitution and Union must be maintained…’”24  
 Such unity of opinion, however, was absent in perhaps the most important area of 
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the state’s war policy: Economics. Since the opening of the Secession crisis, Wisconsin, 
like much of the rest of the North, had been affected by bank runs and general depression, 
caused largely by the dramatic devaluation of Southern bonds purchased by state banks—
from between 80 and 90 cents on the dollar in late 1860 to between 35 and 50 by April of 
1861—and the halting of trade down the Mississippi River.25 During this same time, 
wheat, corn, butter and potato prices fell to pennies on the dollar, and began to 
accumulate in huge surpluses—farmers could not afford the new, exorbitant freight costs 
charged by merchant ships and railroad interests—where they were not simply destroyed 
outright; an ironic preview of the crisis that would beset Southern planters in the face of 
the Northern naval blockade of cotton and other export goods.    
 In June of 1861, prominent bankers such as Alexander Mitchell of Milwaukee 
tried to eliminate competitors by secretly unloading their own repositories of the 
worthless bonds onto local manufacturing firms—which in turn sent them out to their 
workers through paychecks—and then, on June 24th, publicly challenging their rivals’ 
currency as “discredited and unacceptable.” This provoked riots and attacks on Mitchell’s 
bank by the affected workers, which were only quelled by bringing troops onto the 
streets, and alarmed Mitchell and his associates into offering a plan to substitute state war 
bonds previously snubbed by Wall Street and other Eastern Banks for the worthless 
Southern notes.
26
          
 This cascade of problems was eagerly seized upon by the Democrats, who 
declared them the result of machinations by the New York and New England capitalists 
who controlled the east-west railways—and, by extension, the Republican Party that they 
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believed was intricately intertwined with these interests. A frequent target that summer 
and fall was the Morrill Tariff. Though passed before Fort Sumter, and never more than a 
minor part of the Federal Government’s taxation plans, the measure quickly became 
interpreted as intended to fund wartime expenses by doubling import and export duties 
(17% to roughly 36%). This, Wisconsin Democrats asserted, was the cause of the 
increase in costs to Wisconsin and Midwestern farmers. With these concerns, and the 
gubernatorial election approaching that fall, Democrats began to warn of “the coming 
oppressive taxation” and “general ruin” that would result from Randall’s re-election, and 
from Republican policies in general.
27
      
 Wisconsin Republicans responded to this criticism with three distinct measures. 
Knowing that the depression at home and the lackluster performance on the battlefield, 
particularly in the recent case of First Bull Run, could combine against them, they chose 
to continue beating the drum of patriotism. In further speeches and editorials, they 
reaffirmed their main pledge to preserve the Union, heaping blame for the overall 
economic and political crisis squarely on the Rebels. Secondly, they castigated their 
Democrat critics as traitors, declaring them to be aiding the Confederacy and obstructing 
the war effort whenever they spoke against Randall and Lincoln in particular, or the 
Republican Party. This last was partly softened by their declaration of an umbrella 
“Union” Party, taking in all “loyal” state citizens that maintained allegiance to the United 
States, which would prosecute the war to its fullest until victory. In this way, they hoped 
to attract moderate Democrats to their banner, and to assure their majority in the 
Legislature and the state Cabinet.       
 Governor Randall himself implemented the third measure—departing office. 
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Though he had harbored third-term ambitions, Randall had come to realize that the 
depression had marred his and the Republican Party’s image in the eyes of the voters, and 
that it would be best if he removed himself as the most obvious target for their discontent. 
Furthermore, many in the party itself and among its wealthy backers had and were 
turning against him. Some did so based on his presumed ineptitude with regards to 
equipping the state regiments, particularly issuing uniforms that rotted away in rains, or 
which were the same embarrassing (and dangerous) gray color as that of the Rebels. 
Others attacked him for mismanagement of the bond crisis that allowed the East to reject 
the state’s currency, and brought the railroads against him over the issue of transport 
costs. It did not matter that Randall had pushed for improvements in all these areas from 
the time of Fort Sumter, or that he had offered sage advice to the Lincoln administration 
on how to implement them nationwide; in the case of the army equipage issue, it can be 
argued that these efforts only made him more of a liability in the eyes of the national 
party. Faced with such difficulties, Randall decided it would be better to quietly drop out 
of the governor’s race. This decision was later rewarded by Lincoln with the offer of the 
post of minister to Rome, which Randall accepted, and ensured the former governor a 
career at the federal level beyond the wartime period.     
 When Randall’s departure became publicly known in September, both Democrats 
and Republicans began working in earnest to find likely candidates. Though Randall’s 
exit might seem to have affected the latter most crucially, both parties were suffering 
from internal leadership struggles and external campaign difficulties at this time. On the 
Republican side, the Madison wing of the party, headed by Madison postmaster and state 
party “Boss” Elisha W. Keyes, managed to retain overall control in the face of 
maneuvering by their Milwaukee brethren, which was crucial in light of the approaching 
32 
 
  
“Union Party” convention, set for September 24th. When this event finally took place, the 
Republican delegates came together to nominate Southport (Kenosha) native Louis 
Harvey for the governorship, with a sop to the “War Democrats”—as moderate defectors 
from that party to the “Union” banner were soon known—in the form of three spots on 
the ticket, out of nine contested state offices—including the post of lieutenant governor, 
which was eventually accepted by Democratic Milwaukee lawyer, Edward Salomon.
28
 
This, however, would be the last real advantage that the Republicans would gain from 
such “unity” tactics in this campaign.     
 Meanwhile, the Democrats, despite the “Union” defections, believed that 
Randall’s withdrawal, the state’s continuing economic doldrums, and the still-present 
fears of innate Republican nativism among immigrant groups would grant them majority 
control. When the state delegates convened on October 8, 1861, they immediately passed 
resolutions denouncing the “Union Party” as nothing more than a front for the 
Republicans, and roundly attacked both Randall’s and Lincoln’s domestic and war 
policies. Once this was done, they duly nominated Benjamin Ferguson, a prosperous 
farmer from Dodge County, as their candidate for governor, alongside a complete list of 
seekers for the remaining offices. As the final weeks of the campaign progressed, the 
Democrats stepped up their criticism of Republican policy, both enacted and anticipated. 
The specter of emancipation—and its presumed outcome of economic decline and 
“Negro mongrelization” through marriage and other interaction—was also a frequently 
employed tactic by Democratic speakers and editors, with the aim of retaining their base 
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among the German, Irish and other immigrant constituencies.
29
    
 Once the tallies were finished, it was clear the “Union Party” tactic had proven 
both a success and a failure. Harvey had won the governorship by a concrete majority 
(53,777 to 45,575), yet the Democrats had made substantial gains in the Senate, and they 
had a likely chance for control of the Assembly in the next elections; only the “fusion” 
effect of the “Union Party,” or so the Democrats believed, had prevented them from 
achieving a majority in either chamber.
30
 This belief was further strengthened when the 
results of the bellwether Congressional elections elsewhere in the nation were considered: 
the Democratic presence in the House increased by twenty-seven seats (88-72), primarily 
in the electorally crucial states of Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York, but the party had 
been prevented from taking control of the chamber by further “Union” defections—
twenty-four in all.          
 The “Union” banner had in fact drawn very few Democratic delegates to the 
Republican side, in Wisconsin and across the nation. This illuminated the decline of 
ostensible pro-war unity between the parties, and foreshadowed the state government’s 
difficulties in meeting wartime demands.  Thus, while the Republicans cheered Harvey’s 
inauguration in January of 1862, the Democrats began to prepare in earnest for next 
year’s elections. With the moderates now quieted, or “seduced” from their ranks, theirs 
was now largely a party of staunch opponents to Lincoln in particular, and the 
Republicans as a whole. This transformation was to have a profound effect on the 
ideology and rhetoric of both major parties for the coming year and the remainder of the 
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Civil War, and lead to resentment and antagonism that would not be confined to the halls 
of government. 
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Chapter 2 
Disillusionment: Late 1861—Early 1863 
I. 
 “The result of this cause is not doubtful; and the end will be worth to the cause of Freedom and 
good government all the sacrifices and cost of the war.” 
-Gov. Louis P. Harvey, Jan 10
th
, 1862 
 
Like Randall, Louis P. Harvey was an Easterner. Born in Connecticut in 1820, his 
family had been among the multiple waves of New Englanders that spread across the 
then-lightly settled Midwest. After attending Western Reserve College in Ohio, he had 
moved to Southport in the early 1840s, serving as a teacher, postmaster and editor of a 
local Whig newspaper, the Southport American. When the Republican Party emerged in 
1854 from the wreckage of the Whigs’ collapse two years prior, he was married and 
living in Rock County. Upon joining the nascent party, he was elected to the State 
Senate; in 1858 he was chosen as one of the delegates to the party’s national convention. 
When the 1859 state elections arrived, he was chosen as Secretary of State.
31
  
 During the 1860 election period, he campaigned energetically for Lincoln, and 
was widely credited as a crucial factor in delivering the state to the Republican 
presidential candidate. With a reputation as a devoted, hardworking party man, he had 
campaigned hard for the governorship, despite the general lack of enthusiasm throughout 
the state (beyond the war effort), and was considered the natural successor to Randall by 
the vast majority of Republicans. Even the Democratic delegates initially found little 
cause for argument with him, despite their bitterness at the pro-war “Union Party” 
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strategy that had put him into office at the expense of depleting their ranks. For the 
moment, all eyes and efforts from both parties were focused on the war.  
 From the start of his tenure, Harvey made clear that this focus would be the 
cornerstone of his policies. In his inaugural speech to the Legislature, he outlined, in dry 
yet all-encompassing detail, the amounts raised to that time for disbursement by the state 
War Fund ($957,368.79), the expenses for the ten Wisconsin regiments then in the field 
($1,656,659.98), and the number of volunteers expected to fill out the Lincoln 
Administration’s call for three-year or duration troops (24,800) by spring.32 He also 
called for voting greater funds for enlisted men through amendments to the Soldier 
Volunteer Aid Act; this would provide better pay—and further incentives for other 
potential volunteers—and also give further credence to his campaign pledge to serve as 
“the soldier’s friend.” He then concluded his speech with a fierce attack on the “plotters 
for a Southern Monarchy” who had brought about the war, and a pledge of cooperation 
and amity with the state’s parties: “Trusting that the views I have presented will not be 
without their influence upon your action—that your deliberations and determinations will 
all be marked in the absence of partisan feeling, and by patriotic devotion to the Union, I 
conclude with proffering hearty co-operation of the Executive in every measure of 
beneficent legislation.”33         
 Harvey soon found that “beneficent legislation” would be difficult to pass, even 
with bipartisan support. As the Governor himself had noted, the state’s reserves were 
already running dry due to the demands of the nearly 10,000 men in the field and those 
still in training, and the national tax for the war effort—$20 million, of which 
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Wisconsin’s share was nearly $600,000—had not yet been paid. Therefore, in response to 
Harvey’s request for increased soldier funds, the Legislature had agreed upon payments 
of $5 a month, but to the families of each enlisted man—and much of these funds were 
never paid out, for the simple reason that there were none available in spite of patriotic 
demands.         
 Seeking to make good on his pledge, Harvey reached out again to the Legislature 
in a special message on February 18
th
, demanding that the funds be made available by 
whatever means to the roughly 3,100 claimants thus far, and highlighting how the fact 
that the $5 monthly payments were “the sole dependence of a helpless family against cold 
and hunger” was an acute embarrassment to the government.34 Nonetheless, a total 
payment of $50,000 would not be made into the relief fund until April, and disbursement 
problems persisted. Public outcry was softened by soliciting nearly $4 million from the 
federal government, and issuing a total of $3 million in new state bonds to replace earlier 
permanent funds.
35
 This drawn-out affair illustrated the Republican-dominated state 
leadership’s continuous difficulties in funding as well as meeting its military demands, 
and the level to which popular resentment of the war’s economic burden had risen.   
 Harvey’s relationship with the Legislature would become even more problematic 
over another wartime measure—pay commissioners. Shortly after the start of the war, 
Lincoln and the Federal Congress had passed legislation which allowed for volunteers to 
send all or a portion of their pay to their families, in an intended manner of relief similar 
to that of the state’s Volunteer Aid Act. A crucial part of this measure was the 
appointment of three commissioners by each state, whose task was to collect allotments 
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from the camps and dispense them at home. This, of course, was a system ripe for 
corruption, particularly since the commissioners—despite receiving credentials from 
Washington as federal employees—were expected to have their salaries paid by their 
home states. Furthermore, since such agents were appointed by the ruling party in each 
state, they were likely to serve as direct or indirect promoters of the Republican agenda 
wherever they were posted.        
 From the start, Wisconsin Democrats and their brethren nationwide had viewed 
this program with suspicion. When Governor Randall had announced that each 
Wisconsin regiment sent off to war would have a state agent to accompany it—“Good 
Samaritan” was the term most often used to describe the intended program—the 
Democrats immediately heaped criticism on this decision. In their eyes, the “Samaritan 
system” was simply another means by which the Republicans could campaign and extend 
their influence over the armed forces through “political commissars,” as well as the 
territories and populations recaptured for the Union. Harvey’s actions in this area only 
intensified the opposition’s efforts. Upon becoming Governor, he had pushed through 
changes to the commissioner system in Wisconsin, allowing the Executive branch of the 
state government to name the agents directly—thereby allowing him to appoint political 
allies and “deserving party workers.”36 To the Democrats, this merely confirmed their 
fears of Republican dominance and graft, and intensified their opposition to Harvey. 
 However, they would not have long to challenge Governor Harvey on this issue, 
or any others. In the first days of April 1862, word arrived in the state of the narrow and 
hideously expensive Union victory at Shiloh (Pittsburg Landing), Tennessee: nearly 
24,000 combined casualties, including more than 2,000 dead, wounded or captured 
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Wisconsin soldiers—the largest and bloodiest battle yet seen on American soil. 
Immediately after receiving the news, Harvey issued a call for citizens to donate or 
contribute funds for medical supplies, which he would personally deliver to the hospital 
camps and ships on the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers. Once he had received nearly a 
hundred crates of bandages, medicines and other goods, Harvey departed for the 
battlefield in the second week of April with a coterie of volunteer surgeons in tow. Two 
days later, after visiting a number of regimental camps near Pittsburg’s Landing, Harvey 
attempted to cross from one steamboat to another midstream, and fell into the Tennessee 
River. Despite rescue attempts he was swept away by the current, and subsequently 
drowned. His body was not recovered until it had traveled almost sixty miles 
downstream, close to two weeks later.
37
      
 The sudden death of the “soldier’s friend” —Harvey had been in office for barely 
three months—produced great mourning in the governor’s home state and portended a 
major shift in public opinion towards and allegiance to the Republican Party. With the 
losses at Shiloh and other engagements, the perceived widespread ineptitude of the 
Union’s commanders, and the increasing burdens of enlistment quotas, wartime expenses 
and national taxes, the Democratic Party in both Wisconsin and the nation now had major 
potential assets for their campaigns that year and beyond. The state and country was 
growing weary of the war—and this weariness and opposition would soon make itself 
known, with violence as well as speeches. 
II. 
“That whenever the President of the of the United States shall call forth the militia of the States, to 
be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service 
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will be required, not exceeding nine months; and the militia so called shall be mustered in and continue to 
serve for and during the term so specified, unless sooner discharged by command of the President.” 
--Opening paragraph of the Militia Act of July 17
th
, 1862 
 
When word of Louis Harvey’s death reached Madison, Lieutenant Governor 
Edward Salomon was rapidly confirmed as his replacement. With this act, the nature of 
Wisconsin’s wartime governance, and its opposition, was to change dramatically.   
 Apart from his relatively young age—33—Salomon differed from his Republican 
predecessors in several notable ways. For one, though Randall and Harvey were New 
England transplants to Wisconsin, Salomon was a newly naturalized U.S. citizen upon 
becoming governor. Born in Stroebeck, Prussia in 1828, he and his brothers, Charles and 
Frederick—both of whom would later become generals in the Union Army—had 
immigrated to Wisconsin in 1849, settling in the port town of Manitowoc. Through the 
1850s, he served at various times as a teacher, court clerk and county surveyor, gained 
admission to the Milwaukee bar in 1856, and became a regent of the University of 
Wisconsin in 1861.
38
           
 For another, he was a relatively recent entrant not only to the governorship, but to 
politics in general. Upon entering the country, he had sided with the Democratic Party, 
but when the threat of secession loomed at the start of 1860, Salomon’s antislavery 
inclinations led him to break with the Southern Democrats whom he perceived as 
controlling the party, and declare himself a Republican. Seeking to garner more of the 
German-American vote in the eastern counties during the 1861 elections, the state party 
placed Salomon’s name on the ticket for lieutenant governor, despite his lack of prior 
office-holding or other political experience. He was to prove both a devoted and 
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controversial choice, in the eyes of his party and the state’s citizenry.    
 When Harvey’s death handed Salomon the reins of power, it also ushered in the 
state’s transition from the optimism and exuberant patriotism that characterized its 
attitude towards and hopes for the war. Volunteering for service was still proceeding, but 
at a far lower level than during the initial months of the war, a clear indication of how 
unpopular the ever-lengthening and ever-bloodier conflict had become. What was more, 
the Federal government appeared increasingly inept at managing recruitment. Though the 
allegedly corrupt Simon Cameron had resigned as Secretary of War in January of 1862, 
his replacement Edwin Stanton disbanded much of the bureaucracy needed for federal 
recruitment efforts shortly after entering office, then made an about-face on this policy 
after the carnage of the Shiloh and Peninsular Campaigns. This shift fueled further 
accusation of mismanagement from the Democrats and even from among branches of the 
Republicans. When combined with growing awareness of the financial burden of the war, 
and of perceived corruption and abuses within the Lincoln administration, these charges 
served to turn more and more of Wisconsin and the country as a whole against the 
Republican Party.          
 Well aware of this trend, Governor Salomon found himself in the thick of trying 
to reverse it from almost the first days of his tenure. Washington proved anything but 
helpful; on July 17
th
, after a call two weeks prior by President Lincoln for 300,000 three-
year volunteers, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1862. The key element of this act 
called for a draft by each state of the Union into that state’s militia, with all able-bodied 
men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five registered for call-up, if volunteers were 
not enough to fill recruitment quotas. This decree was followed at the start of August by 
yet another call from Lincoln—300,000 nine-month volunteers, of whom Wisconsin’s 
42 
 
  
expected contribution was 42,557. In short, the Federal government had declared its 
needs—and the state governments, regardless of at-home tensions, were obliged to fulfill 
them.
39
          
 Presented with these decrees one after another, Salomon now had to implement 
them. Three thorny issues confronted him from the start: dividing the announced state 
quota into suitable demands at the county level; awarding “credits” for volunteers who 
had already been registered from those counties; and creating a register of all those 
eligible for the draft, which would greatly aid the first two endeavors. The quota and 
credit efforts were complicated and delicate—county recruitments needed careful 
scrutinizing to avoid complaints of overburdening or bias—but capable of 
implementation. The last, however, was sure to provoke ire towards the governor and the 
ruling party from the state’s citizens and the increasingly powerful Democrats, 
conceivably to such levels as to cost the Republicans control of the state. With half of the 
state legislature and six Congressional seats on the line in the upcoming November 
elections, this was no idle concern.        
 While Salomon was laboriously negotiating the county quotas, another message 
arrived from Washington, specifically from Secretary of War Stanton. Given recent 
losses among the Wisconsin regiments, Stanton now sought nearly 6,000 men, in addition 
to the previous state quota, to refill these depleted units no later than the end of August. 
To make matters worse in Salomon’s eyes, this order explicitly called for a state draft if 
the required number could not be met with volunteers. At first, Salomon responded by 
stating that since five regiments’ worth of men—far beyond the call of previous state 
quotas—had already been provided, these should be “credited” to Wisconsin, and the 
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new levies be met with the use of a cash bounty system to attract recruits, alongside the 
standard volunteering drives. However, on August 15
th, Stanton’s reply scotched the 
Governor’s hopes. The draft would proceed in Wisconsin, regardless of Salomon’s 
concerns.
40
          
 The draft process finally began in early September, overseen by state 
commissioner Levi B. Vilas, a Madison banker and staunch War Democrat. On 
September 10
th
, as the enrollments were proceeding, Governor Salomon called a special 
session of the legislature. In his address, he stated that the North had been “sadly 
mistaken” in its belief that the earliest calls for volunteers would be enough to put down 
the rebellion, and bemoaned the fact that the recruits sent off since that time were 
“hurried to the field without having had time to learn the most necessary military drill 
and discipline.
41”           
 This last problem, he argued, had been even more glaringly exposed when the 
widespread paranoia and panic regarding the recent Native uprisings in Minnesota. 
Following a series of raids and local murders in late August by the Sioux tribes dwelling 
within this state, some 40,000 white settlers had fled eastward across the Mississippi and 
into the northwest counties of Wisconsin, spreading word of worse to come. Among the 
Wisconsinites, this had rapidly translated into fear and suspicion that the northern 
tribes—Chippewa, Potawatomi and others—would soon join the revolt, or had already 
done so, and would march on Milwaukee and the southern counties. Though the wave of 
false terror had eventually ebbed, it had, according to Salomon, forced him to send “all 
our State arms and all the ammunition at my disposal, into the regions threatened with 
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danger; but in the absence of any military organization under sanction of law, I had to 
trust these arms to some reliable men in these localities.”; hardly an encouraging image 
of the state’s defenses. Therefore, Salomon concluded, the only option that would ensure 
the state’s safety, and provide those citizens called to the colors with suitable training and 
discipline, was the establishing of a more efficient militia draft, since “present laws are 
insufficient for this purpose; they were not made for such times or emergencies.
42” 
 Unfortunately for Salomon, the Legislature balked on this issue, choosing instead 
to adjourn and leave the issue of a better draft system in his hands. Regardless of party, 
none of the delegates wanted the taint association with such a widely unpopular measure, 
and so they in effect handed over their vested control over the state’s wartime efforts to 
the Governor.            
 Nor were the legislators the only ones to use whatever legal means available to 
avoid the issue. Despite steady enrollment, popular opposition to the draft was manifold, 
and growing. Two methods of dodging were particularly popular: In a blackly comic 
foreshadowing of similar methods used in the 20
th
 century, a significant number of the 
state’s eligible male population either fled to Canada (claiming “draft malaria,” with the 
notion that the northern climes could cure it) or began to claim physical disability, citing 
chronic illness or other exemption-worthy conditions. In Manitowoc County, so many 
exemptions were handed out by the assigned surgeon that Salomon was forced to declare 
all of them invalid, incurring further opprobrium. Another temporary escape was 
enlisting as firemen, a field of service that provided exemptions from militia duty; the 
governor was soon likewise forced to place limits on the number of recruits to this field.
43
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 For Salomon, the most embarrassing (and politically dangerous) draft-dodging 
option—utilized heavily among the state’s German-born population—was to file 
exemption as “aliens,” without the intent of becoming citizens. Under Wisconsin law, 
any foreign-born resident who made clear his intent to become a citizen was guaranteed 
voting rights prior to completing naturalization. When Governor Salomon ruled, with 
Stanton’s approval, that all those among the state’s “alien” population who had made 
their “declaration of intent” to become citizens would be included on the draft rolls, a 
torrent of objections came from the immigrant communities. For the Germans, 
Luxembourgers, and others from Central and Eastern Europe, the threat of conscription in 
their homelands had been one of their primary motivations in coming to America, and to 
see it now implemented—especially to bolster a war effort many of them, for political or 
religious reasons, did not believe they had a stake in—was a violation of the promises 
made to them when they arrived. And this perception was fast translating into greater and 
greater hostility to the draft, and to the Republican Party.
44
   
 Looking to ally such grievances with their own, Wisconsin Democrats turned up 
the heat, both in speeches and the press. In the run-up to their party’s state convention in 
Madison on September 3
rd
, 1862, Democratic legislators attacked every issue that they 
believed would bear fruit in the fall elections—the chicanery of the bond substitutions, 
the soaring expenses of maintaining Wisconsin units compared to other loyal states, the 
“wet nurse system” of regimental commissioners, legislative and judicial abuses by the 
Lincoln administration (especially arrests by the military and the temporary suspension of 
habeas corpus during the previous year), and many others. More and more, the attacks 
began to tilt away from simple criticism of Lincoln and the Republican war effort, and 
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toward a platform which called for peace with the South, possibly on any terms—which 
could potentially bring charges of disloyalty and even treason.     
 When the Democratic convention formally opened, the delegate chosen to chair 
the resolutions committee—which determined the party’s overall platform—was Edward 
G. Ryan, who after 1846 had made a name for himself as the prosecutor in Sherman 
Booth’s trial for the Glover rescue, and also as the advocate for Bashford in the state 
Supreme Court’s effort to unseat the Democrat Barstow. In his main speech to the 
delegates (first termed “An Address to the People by the Democracy of Wisconsin,” then 
simply the “Ryan Address,” or the “Copperhead Bible” by its detractors), Ryan 
denounced the “fanaticism,” both Northern and Southern, that he perceived had brought 
about the war, and eloquently attacked Lincoln’s Presidency for worsening the crisis. 
Knowing that such criticism needed careful phrasing, however, Ryan also reaffirmed his 
Party’s commitment to ending the war, and to the ideals of the nation: “The 
Administration may err, but the Constitution does not change. And when the 
Administration violates the Constitution, loyalty to the Administration may become 
disloyalty to the Union […] We are for the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it 
was.”45          
 This last ambition would soon be put to the test. On September 22
nd
, five days 
after the drawn battle at Antietam, President Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation, which officially—albeit selectively and de facto impotently—declared “all 
persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof 
shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and 
forever free.” In the eyes of Democrats, therefore, what had been a bungled yet honest 
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military effort to preserve the Union had now become an anti-slavery crusade—precisely 
the type of campaign that they, the conservative Republican wing, and a large majority of 
the Northern voting populace had feared and opposed since the war’s beginning.   
 Two days later, in an edict titled General Order 141, Lincoln declared the 
suspension of habeas corpus throughout the North, with the intent of suppressing both 
active military or financial aid to the Rebellion, and criminalizing any moral support 
delivered through speeches, publications or legislation. Taken with measures pushed 
through the Legislature that same month to allow soldiers in the field to vote in state 
elections—a largely unprecedented, and possibly unconstitutional, idea—the storm of 
criticism against the perceived tyrannies on the part of Lincoln and the governor’s office 
was increasing exponentially.  Across Wisconsin, the voters’ attitudes toward the war 
were becoming more and more resentful, and the fear of violence and mobs was not far 
from the minds of the state’s leaders. Public opinion was now turning sharply in the 
Democrats’ favor, and they stood to gain from it in just over a month’s time.   
III. 
“It is one of the inherent and necessary powers of every government to call upon its citizens, or 
subjects, to take up arms in its defense. This power exists, beyond question in the Government of the 
United States. […] Resistance by you to the Government of the United States, or of this State, is both 
wrong and vain, and can lead only to calamity and misfortune to those who attempt it. The draft will be 
executed in your County as well as in every other county in the State, where it has been ordered.” 
--Gov. Edward Salomon, in a letter to the citizens of Ozaukee County, Nov. 11, 1862 
 
Realizing the poor timing of the process, Salomon announced in October that all 
draft calls would be put on hold until after the elections in November, claiming that this 
would allow more time and opportunity for volunteers alone to fill the county quotas—
his original hope. This decision, however, met with minimal success. While the majority 
of the county governments were able to provide their required number of recruits without 
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much difficulty, six in particular—Milwaukee, Sheboygan, Ozaukee, Fond du Lac, 
Washington and Brown—had shown hardly any such results, due to the large number of 
German and other Central European residents who remained staunchly opposed. Thus, on 
November 7
th
, as the fall election results were still being tallied, the Governor’s office 
issued General Order No. 35, which ordered commissioners in these counties to proceed 
with the draft. The men would be counted and the quotas filled, regardless of the political 
fallout and criticism—or the tensions on the ground.    
 This would prove a serious miscalculation. By the start of November, angry 
crowds and demonstrations had already appeared in Milwaukee, Sheboygan, West Bend 
and elsewhere, and though these had not yet progressed beyond throwing chants at best 
and eggs or stones at worst, the danger of greater disorder was ever-present. The results 
of the elections did not help matters for the Republicans; despite failing to gain hoped-for 
majorities on all contested tickets, the Democrats now controlled three out of six 
Congressional seats, and their presence in the Legislature had been substantially 
increased, now standing at 46-54 in the Assembly and 15-18 in the Senate.
46
 Had it not 
been for the votes of battlefield troops—of which 80% were given to the Republicans, 
giving rise to rumors and accusations of fraud—Lincoln’s party in Wisconsin would have 
suffered even greater losses.
47
       
 On November 11
th
, the tensions boiled over. When William H. Pors, the draft 
commissioner for Ozaukee County—as well as a Democrat and a German—stepped out 
from the courthouse to begin the lottery in Port Washington, he was greeted first with 
angry shouts, then fists and boots. After managing to get away, he holed up in the cellar 
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of the post office, while the anti-draft mob destroyed his house, along with those of seven 
other men—prominent Republicans all—who had declared themselves in favor of 
conscription.           
 Republican newspapers were quick to place blame, for both the Port Washington 
incident and recent incipient disturbances in Milwaukee. The Wisconsin State Journal 
opined, on November 11
th
, that the anti-draft mobs reported marching in the latter city 
“will learn their mistake. Mob law is not yet paramount in Wisconsin […] The draft will 
be enforced in Milwaukee as in other parts of the State. No section of the State will be 
permitted to withhold its quota, and force upon the more patriotic districts which have 
raised their proportion by voluntary enlistments the additional burden of making good 
such deficiencies.” Upon learning that “one Adam Poertner” a recently elected 
Democratic Assemblyman, had been pointed out as a leader of the anti-draft processions, 
the Journal demanded that he be “promptly arrested and confined. Such a man has no 
right to sit in the Legislature of a loyal State.”48      
 Having tried to warn Secretary of War Stanton of its technical burdens and 
outright dangers, Salomon was now required to implement by force the draft he had so 
reluctantly consented to. That night, six companies of troops from the 28
th
 Wisconsin 
Regiment departed their Milwaukee barracks for Port Washington, under the command of 
Provost Marshal Augustus Gaylord. In his “Proclamation to the People of Ozaukee 
County,” dated November 11th, the governor sharply denounced the “disgraceful and 
violent disturbance of the public peace and forcible resistance to the draft,” and 
announced that he had “taken steps to have the perpetrators and abettors of these crimes 
promptly arrested.” Fully aware of the tensions then facing the draft in Milwaukee and 
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other major centers, he concluded with a plea to the county’s residents “to make no 
further resistance to the lawfully constituted authorities, but to submit to the laws of the 
Country.”49           
 The same day of this announcement, one hundred and fifty men believed 
responsible for destroying records and other property were arrested by the newly-arrived 
troops, and marched to Milwaukee, where they would be held in military prison pending 
charges. Within a matter of days, Pors was again on duty as commissioner, with a cordon 
of soldiers surrounding the Port Washington courthouse and deployed throughout the 
streets to ensure a peaceful lottery. Eighty of the seized men would be released by mid-
December, while thirty-four would eventually enlist or be drafted. Due to President 
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the previous September, however, the 
remaining fifteen were held for military trial, in accordance with the suspension’s 
declared intent that “all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia draft 
or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to Rebels against the authority 
of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by 
Courts Martial or Military Commission.” This would be among the first instances in 
which civilians would be tried in such courts in the nation, and the very first in 
Wisconsin.          
 Such a decision only served to increase the criticism from both the Democrats and 
now elements of the Republicans. Combined with the dread of further disturbances in 
Milwaukee—which Salomon had attempted to head off with a plea similar to that aimed 
at Ozaukee, and endorsing the decision of that county’s commissioner to suspend call-ups 
until more troops were available—and the still-present paranoia and fear regarding the 
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presumed Sioux invasion of the previous September, the antiwar sentiments rose yet 
higher. “In Heaven’s name, let us have no more of this conscription—a system which the 
most prescriptive monarchical government would scarce resort to,” lamented Flavius 
Mills of the Democratic Sheboygan Journal.
50
      
 While the rioters’ actions were not embraced by either of these groups, they were 
adroitly pointed to as proof of the public’s anger towards the draft, and the actions of 
Salomon and Lincoln, especially in their apparent capitulation to the “Radical” branch of 
the Republican Party through emancipation and other measures aimed at destroying 
slavery at the presumed expense of the traditional Union. Responding to a Tribune article 
lauding the use of “bayonet and ball” to overawe the “home rebels” in the “malcontent 
neighborhood” of Port Washington, the Daily Milwaukee News opined acidly: 
“Wisconsin needs no advice from the Chicago Tribune. This state can take care of itself. 
The whetted abolition appetite for blood is not likely to be appeased yet on Wisconsin 
soil.”51           
 To the Democrats, given their recent gains, the disturbances provided a mandate 
to challenge Republican policy across the board in Wisconsin, and possibly nationwide. 
The state’s leaders, editors and citizens opposed to the Lincoln and the war had made 
their views clear in print, speech and violence, and forced the Republican leadership to 
abandon or reshape its wartime policy to placate crucial voters.  As 1863 opened, these 
groups stood at the zenith of their influence, and believed themselves poised for yet more 
success. 
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Chapter 3 
Discord: Early 1863—Early 1864 
I.  
“[…] I think the President has no power…to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is, in my 
judgment, a legislative and not an executive act.” 
--Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Luther S. Dixon, regarding the In re Kemp verdict 
 
The first major challenges to Republican policy, regarding the soldier vote and the 
question of habeas corpus, began almost immediately after the fall results of 1862 had 
been fully counted.          
 Both areas posed equally serious difficulties for the opposition. In light of the 
results from the 1861 state and local elections, Wisconsin Republicans had adopted the 
theory of military ballots from previous efforts by their party brethren and backers in 
Missouri, who had seen such a system as the only means of keeping the crucial border 
state under the Northern banner. In his special address to the Legislature on September 
10
th
, 1862, Governor Salomon had formally called for the creation and passage of a 
soldier-vote law: 
“After our quota shall have been filled, we shall have about 48,000 men in the 
army of the Union. Among these, it is safe to presume there are at least 40,000 voters 
who certainly have as deep, if not a deeper, interest in the welfare of the state and Union, 
and in the policy that shall guide their counsels in their representative halls as those who 
have remained at home. The views of these brave and patriotic men should be heard 
through the ballot box, and should have proper weight in shaping the destiny of our 
imperiled country.”52 
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With the Republicans still in control of both houses, creation and passage was 
swift, with fifty-two to forty in the Assembly and nineteen to seven in the Senate. 
Democratic protest was vociferous, and exposed the partisanship of the issue. For 
Wisconsin Democrats, it was not simply a question of constitutionality as to whether the 
state’s citizens in uniform be allowed to vote from afar; the measure itself was a blatant, 
unconstitutional grab by the Republicans for influence at the front and greater dominance 
at home.           
 This attitude had been reinforced by reports of widespread fraud within the voting 
processes of the state regiments. According to the voting legislation, three ranking 
officers from each unit were required to serve as election inspectors and ballot counters. 
As nearly all the colonels of these regiments were Republicans, the Democrats 
considered the entire inspection arrangement potentially biased at best. During the 
aftermath of the election, word reached Democratic papers of fraud and other illegalities 
on the part of these “inspectors”: allegedly stumping for candidates among their men both 
before and during Election Day, altering the tallies in their party’s favor, and even 
destroying or denying ballots from companies which had been raised in Democratic-
leaning districts.
53
 When these actions were combined with the habeas corpus 
suspension, and its exercise in the form of the Port Washington arrests, the Democrats—
and a growing number of Wisconsin voters—saw yet another example of the state’s and 
nation’s slide towards tyranny under the Republican Party.    
 To combat these actions, the Democrats—now increasingly represented by 
Edward Ryan and others of his conservative brand—turned to the courts. In early 
December of 1862, after the Port Washington rioters had been brought before military 
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courts and imprisoned in accordance with General Order 141, one of their number, 
Nicholas Kemp, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus before the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. Since Kemp was a civilian, the writ argued, and his arrest and detention was based 
on the judgment of the military rather than a civilian court, he was therefore deprived of 
his constitutional right to a fair trial, and had been illegally imprisoned. After initial 
resistance, the military—represented in this case by the commander of the Northwest 
Department, Brig. General W.L. Elliot—released Kemp for trial.    
 Shortly after this event, Edward Ryan announced that he would represent Kemp, 
in the hope that not only would the Republican-dominated Wisconsin Court declare 
Kemp’s arrest illegal, but it would also challenge the suspension order itself, with the 
possibility of taking the case to the US Supreme Court and further embarrassing Lincoln 
and the Republican Party. In his argument, Ryan stated that the Presidential suspension 
was unconstitutional for the simple fact that only Congress had the authority to order 
such suspensions; and even if it could be proven that this power did rest with the 
Executive Branch, it did not allow for illegal arrests of civilians. On January 23
rd
, 1863, 
the three-man Court handed down exactly the verdict Ryan had hoped for: Kemp was 
ordered released, and the suspension was declared an illegal usage of Congressional 
authority by Lincoln. The Court’s official decision, released in two distinct statements, 
ran: 
1. “The power of suspending the writ of habeas corpus under the first section of 
Art. IX of the Constitution of the United States, is a legislative power, and is 
vested in Congress, and the President has no power to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus within the sense of that section of her constitution 
 
2. “Martial law is restricted to and can exist only in those places which are the 
actual theater of  war and immediate vicinity, and it cannot be extended to 
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remote districts, or those not immediately connected with the operations of the 
contending armies.”54 
 
 The Wisconsin Democrats’ euphoria over this victory would prove short-lived. 
Although the suspension had been overturned, Ryan had failed to bring about a challenge 
to the draft law itself. Also, U.S. Attorney General Edward Bates chose not to contest the 
decision, seeking to avoid bringing such a controversial case before the nation’s Supreme 
Court—which, under the Democratically partisan Chief Justice Roger Taney, had already 
challenged the administration in its ordering the overturning of the 1861 temporary 
suspension (Ex Parte Merryman). Instead, he urged Lincoln to seek suspension authority 
from Congress, which had been under debate since the previous month at the behest of 
the “Radical Republicans” and others allied with the President. On March 3rd, 1863, after 
much debate in both houses and an attempted filibuster by Senate Democrats, the Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act was passed and signed into law. Under its provisions, Lincoln 
was indemnified from previous suspensions, and granted the authority to issue such again 
for as long the rebellion lasted. Although protections for future prisoners were also 
codified, the Administration was now shielded from any other challenges similar to those 
of the Kemp case.          
 The soldier-vote challenge, begun at roughly the same time as the Kemp 
proceedings, fared even less successfully. In their case before the state Supreme Court—
titled Chandler v. Main—the Democrats argued that the votes from units in the field had 
unfairly delivered a county office to one candidate (Main) in spite of the home vote 
favoring his opponent (Chandler). Given the favorable decision in the habeas corpus 
matter, they initially believed they would be likewise successful in overturning both the 
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election at issue and the entire soldier-vote mechanism. However, before the verdict was 
handed down, the Republicans in the Legislature countered any negative outcome by 
altering the voting bill to encompass judicial elections, and by selecting the Chief Justice, 
previously independent Luther S. Dixon, as their candidate for the upcoming local and 
Supreme Court elections in April.        
 As a result, the three judges of the court voted unanimously in favor of the 
Republicans. Dixon himself was reelected on the strength of the soldier vote that spring 
and remained thereafter in the Republican camp. The Democratic press cried foul, 
claiming that the army’s ballots had been manufactured or altered, but there was little 
further action after this verdict, as Klement determined.
55
 Still, the opposition had ample 
targets for the newly-begun year, and maintained a healthy level of public support in light 
of the North’s ineptitude on the front lines. 
II. 
“Workmen! Be careful! Organize yourself against this element which threatens your 
impoverishment and annihilation.” 
--Peter V. Deuster, editor of the Milwaukee See-Bote, from his article “Abolition the Worst Enemy 
of the Free White Laborer” 
 
By January 1863, the Lincoln administration and the Republican Party were at the 
lowest point in their political fortunes. The Northern public had proven lukewarm or 
openly hostile to the idea of emancipation, and become similarly incensed or openly 
dismayed by the Union’s dismal war effort and the methods—conscription, suspension of 
constitutional rights, and military courts—used to maintain it over the past year and a 
half. Exploited at every turn by the Democrats, this trend had serious potential to result in 
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further electoral losses in the Congressional elections that fall, and possibly the loss of 
the White House in 1864.        
 In Wisconsin, as in other Northern states, this trend manifested itself in the 
growth of the “Copperhead” ideology. Originally created by the Republican Party, this 
term was intended to smear Democrats who either advocated peace with the CSA in the 
hope of reunion without war, or objected to emancipation as both a valid war measure 
and policy goal. By dehumanizing them with this serpentine comparison, the 
Republicans, Radical and otherwise, sought to label those who had originally been mere 
political rivals as rebels and traitors. This therefore left any person who openly criticized 
the Lincoln Administration, or made any statements deemed sympathetic to the 
Confederacy, vulnerable to arrest and trial by the army.     
 While trying at times to alter the “Copperhead” image for the better, Wisconsin 
Democrats and their counterparts nationwide focused primarily on continued critiques 
and warnings regarding Lincoln’s policies. Fresh from his arguments in the Nicholas 
Kemp case, Edward Ryan took the lead among the state party’s leadership with his 
superb oratory. One example used was the recent case of ardent Copperhead and ex-
congressman Clement Vallandigham, who was eventually forced into Southern exile in 
May of 1863 after having been brought before a military tribunal for making allegedly 
pro-Confederate statements. In the eyes of Ryan and his Wisconsin colleagues, such an 
act by the present administration was the latest exposure of the Republicans’ agenda to 
topple the democracy conceived by the Founding Fathers and replace it with dictatorship. 
The only solution, according to the Ryan Democrats, was to oppose this agenda by any 
and all rhetorical and electoral means, in order to bring about a government with a 
mandate to end the war (with or without Southern independence) and restore, in 
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accordance with their earlier slogan, “The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was.” 
Appealing to such sentiments, the Ryan branch of the Wisconsin Democrats endeavored 
to appear as the defenders of constitutionally-guaranteed traditions and freedoms in the 
face of both the Southern rebellion and the feared domestic shift towards autocracy. 
 Theirs, however, was the most gentlemanly form of argument used by the state 
and national party. Ryan had not shied away from labeling Lincoln and his advisors as 
“fools,” “knaves” and the like, and thus disastrous choices as government leaders, but the 
rhetoric he and his followers employed was largely devoid of harsh language or epithets. 
This was emphatically not the case with other Democrats, Copperhead and otherwise, 
especially those who possessed their own press outlets. The most controversial and 
rancorous of these critics was Morton “Brick” Pomeroy. Though he had temporarily 
fallen under the moderate “Union Party” umbrella in 1861, the La Crosse editor had 
maintained his opposition to any hint of anti-slavery policies. When the final form of the 
Emancipation Proclamation had been issued on January 1
st
, 1863, Pomeroy attacked this 
measure as strenuously as his other colleagues in the Democratic press, thus bringing him 
fully back into the fold of the party after the hardening of its message and ranks following 
the ’61 elections. Not long after this, he gained a press pass, signed by Governor 
Salomon, and chose to tour the front in Missouri and Arkansas.
56
    
 This journey proved both shocking and transformative to the editor and his 
reporting. In his dispatches to the Democrat, various Milwaukee papers and even outlets 
such as the Chicago Times, Pomeroy described rampant corruption amid the officers of 
the Army of the Southwest; specifically, the takeover of cotton land and stocks, and the 
confiscation of supplies other goods—including slaves, now widely viewed as 
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“contraband of war” by Northern generals—from civilians suspected of Rebel 
sympathies, often with the result of impoverishing or starving them. In Pomeroy’s eyes, 
such behavior not only demeaned the troops, but also destroyed any hint of belief that the 
North’s war effort was solely to restore the Union.       
 Traveling further throughout Arkansas, the editor described in vivid detail the 
squalid army camps, the droves of wounded and amputees, and other such dismal sights 
along his journey. With each passing day, Pomeroy’s editorials became more caustic and 
fanatical; he came to believe that the army’s corruption was universal, extending all the 
way to the White House, and that every one of the North’s campaigns—which he 
lambasted as part and parcel of “a murderous crusade for cotton and niggers,” brought on 
by “fire-eaters and abolitionists”—would ultimately come to bloody failure against an 
unbeatable South. Eventually expelled from Arkansas after slandering his military host, 
General Benjamin Prentiss—who had threatened him with arrest as a spy if he returned—
Pomeroy continued to lambast the war in general and Lincoln in particular. Over the 
course of the summer of 1863, he continually charged the President with prolonging the 
war in order to destroy the Constitution, establish military rule, and allow wholesale 
plundering and murder by a rapacious military. One such accusation, delivered in poetic 
form in his La Crosse Weekly Democrat, provided a succinct summation of his attacks:  
“There’s blood upon your garments, 
 There’s guilt upon your soul, 
For the lust of ruthless soldiers 
 You let loose beyond control: 
Your dark and wicked doings 
 A God of mercy sees 
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And the wail of homeless children 
 Is heard on every breeze.”57 
 
Considered insane by most Republicans, and an unflinching critic by his 
Democratic associates, the La Crosse editor would maintain a notoriously high profile for 
the rest of 1863, and into the final years of the war.    
 Pomeroy’s rhetoric demonstrated a cruder, much more populist form of appeal 
and criticism, one that his colleagues in Wisconsin and nationwide had employed to 
varying degrees as far back as 1860, and would now do so on a much wider scale. Rather 
than merely espousing the importance of Union, democracy and property rights—
including slavery, regardless of individual attitudes towards the “peculiar institution”—
Democratic speakers, moderate and Copperhead, chose to play upon the most basic fears 
confronting their base: Race and economics. In his “Address” of the previous September, 
Ryan had made clear the party’s racial stance, and lambasted the Republican incitement 
of the war for such reasons: 
“We hold this country to be the possession of the white race, and this Government 
to be instituted by white men for white men….the proper condition of the African was 
subjection to the white men…The abolition party at the North produced the disunion 
party at the South.”58 
 
Even if the war ultimately ended in Union victory, Ryan and leaders of his stripe 
argued, such a result would only worsen the burdens on the state’s small farmers, artisans 
and urban workers, who at the start of 1863 were still enduring periodic economic 
doldrums brought on by the warfare on land and the North’s naval blockade. Once 
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emancipation was imposed, the Southern economy would collapse, dragging the wearily 
reunified country down still further. And without wages or jobs in this region, the freed 
slaves would inevitably migrate northward, where their cheaper labor would encourage 
regional and Eastern-controlled businesses to force out droves of white workers. The end 
result, Democrats warned, would be ceaseless disorder and violence between whites and 
blacks, and continuous depression aided by the actions of Eastern magnates.  
 Regardless of their expression—whether through oratory of Ryan’s caliber, or 
Pomeroy’s form of abusive journalism—there was little that Lincoln and the Republicans 
could do to refute these and other criticisms hurled their way in the first six months of 
1863. Even those among the state and national populace who ignored or disdained the 
more strident Democratic critics, and maintained their opposition to secession, were 
growing to believe that the war for Union had become little more than a gory stalemate at 
best; or, especially following the spectacular Confederate victory at Chancellorsville and 
Lee’s second invasion of the North, was on the verge of ending in defeat.    
 In Wisconsin, this resulted in men such as Ryan, Pomeroy, and others among the 
state’s Democrats proposing direct overtures to the South for an “honorable peace” that 
restored the Union, with the failed war effort held as proof that “peace and compromise” 
was now the only solution to mend the regional divide. The fact that they had no 
definitive plan for such an outcome was moot; all that mattered at the present time was 
ending the war. “When will the hideous Moloch who holds the press and sword of this 
nation call off his dogs of war, and suffer peace once more to bless our bleeding 
country?” Flavius Mills lamented of the administration.59 Even after the Union victory at 
Gettysburg, such sentiments did not abate. Indeed, given the gruesome casualty lists, and 
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the failure of the Union army to fully destroy Lee’s force during its withdrawal to 
Virginia, they only increased.        
 By the start of summer 1863, the Democrats had prodigious support and 
momentum across the North, thanks in large part to the oratory of their “Copperhead” 
wing and the nation’s increasing disaffection with the party of Lincoln. For Salomon and 
his branch of the Republicans, the bellwether elections for the coming fall would decide 
whether their party’s birthplace would repudiate them after a year of unrest, panic, and 
unpopular laws. For the Lincoln Administration and the national Party, the country was 
fast approaching not only a de facto referendum on them, but also an answer to the 
question of whether or not the nation would be restored.  
III. 
“I am for the Government, right or wrong—for the Government, howsoever and by whomsoever 
administered.” 
--Statement by “War Democrat” Matthew Carpenter, Beloit delegate to the 1863 Democratic state 
convention 
 
As their convention opened in Madison on August 5
th
, 1863, Wisconsin 
Democrats had cause for both concern and celebration. Even though the North was on 
stronger military footing, thanks to the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, there was 
still no guarantee that the war would end in victory. The war’s costs—both human and 
financial—were still skyrocketing, and public exhaustion was nearing similar heights. 
With careful campaigning and prevention of internal squabbles, the Democrats stood a 
decent chance of gaining the governor’s chair, expanding their number in the Legislature, 
and in the case of Edward Ryan, possibly gaining a Senate seat.    
 The most contentious issue that could lead to this outcome was the Enrollment 
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Act, passed in March of that year. The first official conscription act for the Union 
Army—rather than by proxy through the state militias—this legislation seemed to 
confirm public fears of a prolonged campaign of attrition, and of undue influence over 
war and economic policy by a select wealthy few. Under its terms, all healthy males 
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, whether native citizens or recently 
naturalized immigrants, were required to enroll as potential draftees. The only means by 
which one could escape would be by producing a suitably healthy substitute—which soon 
created an industry of “jumper” enlistees who collected what funds they could, then 
deserted to repeat the process again—or by paying a commutation fee of $300, an 
astronomical sum for many of those targeted by the draft. Rubbing salt in the wound, any 
who failed to present themselves when issued draft notices would be arrested and 
subjected to court-martial, as had been the fate of the Port Washington rioters.  
 Public anger at this act had already boiled over most vividly the previous July in 
the form of the New York Draft Riots, which had required nearly four regiments’ worth 
of troops (most of these called from the recent Gettysburg Campaign) to suppress, and 
had given rise to the now widely-popular adage “Rich man’s war, poor man’s fight” to 
describe the real roots of the conflict. And despite pleas for order from Republican (and 
Democratic) figures and newspapers, Wisconsin had already seen its share of violence 
that threatened to reach New York’s level; over the course of spring and summer, 
enrolling officers in Milwaukee, Dodge and other counties had been chased out, beaten, 
even shot for attempting to complete their rolls.
60
 If such antipathy could be channeled 
into the voting booth, the Wisconsin Democrats would gain what they sought, and 
possibly more.          
                                                          
60
 “Wisconsin in the Civil War,” p. 79 
64 
 
  
 On other issues, the likely outcomes were less encouraging, or at least ambivalent. 
The amendments to the 1862 soldier vote legislation had cost the Democrats the chief 
justice seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, leaving them with little chance of repealing 
what they considered  a blatantly unconstitutional measure. Furthermore, Edward Ryan’s 
oratory and stubbornness during the party’s convention for the spring elections had in 
fact worsened the Democrat’s divide during the deliberations over which candidate to 
support for the election. Instead of favoring Mineral Point resident Montgomery Cothren, 
who was considered a staunchly Democratic option, the “high priest of Copperheadism” 
had favored Dixon, and lost on a razor-thin ballot, 70-68. Ryan’s break with his party 
resulted in Dixon’s ultimately gaining the judgeship, in spite of the Republicans’ failure 
to officially name a candidate of their own, and their issuing a lukewarm endorsement of 
the independent candidate. The amendments, passed in the run-up to the elections, 
guaranteed Dixon would remain friendly to Republican interests, despite his ruling in the 
Kemp case.            
 As for the war effort itself, the North’s victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg 
were sufficient on their own to discredit the Democrat’s predictions of costly failure 
against an unbeatable Confederacy. Prior to these events, at the April convention, Edward 
Ryan, again in his capacity as resolutions chairman, had pushed through a series of 
campaign planks even more controversial than his “Address” of the previous year. Two 
of these provoked significant reservations and ire from the conservative Democratic 
wing. The first had been an allegedly unified declaration by the party, accusing President 
Lincoln of seeking to become a dictator through his multiple violations of the 
Constitution and abuse of executive power. The second, and most provocative, had called 
for an armistice with the South, to go into effect immediately, with a “convention of the 
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States” formed between Union and Confederacy so as to resolve their “differences.” In 
short, Ryan was proposing to bring about peace with the very same methods proposed in 
1860—such as those under the aegis of the stillborn Crittenden Compromise—as if the 
last three years, millions expended, and hundreds of thousands dead or maimed could be 
simply set aside.           
 Due to opposition from most of the state delegates, this plank had been shorn of 
much of its stronger language before it was at last passed by the spring convention, along 
with the others put forth by Ryan’s committee. Now, in August, Ryan managed to get 
both his 1862 address and a similar peace plank added to the party platform. This time, 
however, the internal opposition was stronger. As had been the case in 1862, the 
moderates, linked with the nationalistic “War Democrats,” considered Ryan and his 
branch foolhardy at best and “Copperheads” at worst. To this wing of the Democrats, the 
restoration of the Union took precedence over all other concerns, regardless of their 
personal animosities toward specific aspects of the Republican agenda, such as 
emancipation. With such planks as Ryan’s, these delegates feared, the party would likely 
be tarred as false prophets and traitors if the Republicans managed to win the war before 
the next national elections.         
 Into this tense standoff stepped Matthew Carpenter, a Democratic delegate from 
Beloit. Though he had officially declared himself a War Democrat, Carpenter was in fact 
much more opportunistic, leaning towards whichever party appeared strongest and 
likeliest to appeal to his own views on Union—which, in this election cycle, was 
increasingly the Republicans. During the Madison gathering of the previous year, he had 
broken with his former cohort, opposing the Address and endorsing emancipation as a 
legitimate tool of the war, though he and others of the emerging “War Democrats” did 
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not depart the party. Not long after the Ryan planks were approved at the 1863 
convention, Carpenter openly denounced their author and his followers as Copperheads, 
and called for a separate conference in Milwaukee “to determine the true course for 
Wisconsin Democracy.” Forty-five other delegates—derogatorily and approvingly 
termed “bolters”—joined him in this call, and more soon followed across the state, even 
from previously traditional and moderate Democratic leanings.
61
 The remaining delegates 
eventually rallied around a candidate—Milwaukee lawyer Henry Palmer, who was 
considered reliable but uninspiring—but the exodus undermined their show of support. 
Thus, the only viable opposition to the party of Lincoln in 1863 was fragmented, largely 
by its own doing.         
 This split was made even worse by the outcome of the Republican convention, 
also held in Madison at the same time. From its outset, there had been evident concern 
and dissatisfaction among many delegates at the thought of Governor Salomon seeking a 
second term. In the eyes of these men—especially “Boss Keyes”—Salomon had been 
desultory at best in his efforts to maintain support for the party, primarily with regards to 
the still-staunchly Democratic German-American population. He had failed to generate 
any real enthusiasm for emancipation—though considering the existing antipathy towards 
blacks, free and otherwise, among the state’s population, this was perhaps unsurprising—
and there were concerns that his orders quelling any open signs of dissent against the 
draft had further disaffected voters who could be swayed to the Republicans.  
 As a result, Keyes’ Madison machine turned to another candidate, Secretary of 
State James T. Lewis, as the party’s nomination for governor. The pro-Salomon delegates 
objected strenuously; Though Lewis had been a “War Democrat” prior to finally joining 
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the Republican Party, they had serious misgivings as to the sincerity of his realignment, 
and worried that he would prove reluctant to push the party’s wartime and domestic 
goals. Such concerns were highlighted by the informal polls taken before the nominating 
vote on August 10
th
, which showed Salomon leading Lewis 134 to 122. Undeterred, 
“Boss Keyes” arranged for his supporters to stuff the ballot boxes during the formal vote, 
which led to the chairman of the convention declaring this vote invalid after it was found 
that the number of votes exceeded the number of delegates.
62
 Keyes then called for a new 
vote at 8pm that evening, at which time the delegates, thanks to significant back-room 
pressure from the Madison clique, nominated Lewis, 143 to 119. With the succession 
issue settled, the Republicans next created a platform that affirmed their support for 
Lincoln, and for crushing victory over the South, thus strongly indicating that the 
Democratic opposition—Copperhead and otherwise—would be labeled as traitors. 
 Fearing the impact of such rhetoric after the July victories, the “bolter” moderate 
and War Democrats under Matthew Carpenter were all too eager to join the Republicans 
under the renewed “Union” umbrella. On September 17th, Carpenter made this defection 
clear with a speech at a conference in Janesville. Drawing a direct link between the 
Democratic convention in Madison and that of Hartford in 1814—when the Federalists of 
New England had met to seriously consider that region’s secession on the basis of their 
opposition to the War of 1812 and other federal policies of the time—the Beloit “War 
Democrat” called on his colleagues to back Lincoln, and, naively or perhaps 
disingenuously, to set aside the fiercely partisan acts and oratory that threatened the 
Union war effort. With this speech, Carpenter effectively switched parties, and hammered 
in the last nail in the coffin of the Democratic Party’s hopes that year.  
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 Regardless of these events, neither party conceded any ground during summer and 
fall campaign. The Republicans’ efforts revolved around two key strategies: highlighting 
the economic prosperity and military success their party had brought about during the 
past two years, and attacking the presumed treason of the “Peace Democrats” led by 
Ryan and his ilk, as opposed to the loyalty of the “War” members and converts such as 
Lewis. In the case of the first tactic, there was little hope of denying the recent prosperity 
the war had finally brought to the state. Crop prices, primarily those attached to corn, 
wheat, butter, and other goods, had increased to two or three times those of the 1860-61 
depression; these, combined with advances in harvesting technology which required 
fewer hands, and expansion of the wool and dairy trades, helped to alleviate the problems 
that had dogged farmers and city folk alike for more than two years.
63
 And even if the 
war remained costly and stalemated in certain theaters, Gettysburg and Vicksburg made 
powerful arguments against impressions that it was on the verge of ending in failure. 
 As for the second line of attack, the Republicans focused on the most obvious 
target: Ryan’s “Copperhead” peace plank. This resolution had already seen considerable 
debate and assault during the April campaigns for the state Supreme Court, especially in 
the papers of both parties. In an attempt to highlight its presumed treason, one unusual 
Republican twist on the plank ran: “The Copperheads are for peace; Benedict Arnold was 
for peace; therefore, the Copperheads are Benedict Arnolds.”64 Now, with the 
governorship, control of the Legislature, and a Senate seat on the line, these attacks were 
redoubled. With the victories in July, the Republicans claimed, not only was there no 
need for an armistice, much less a “convention of the States,” to settle the war, but any 
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calls by the Democrats for such only underscored this party’s drift towards treason—and 
by extension the Confederacy that was the primary supporter and benefactor of this shift. 
Republican speakers and articles alike asserted that the Copperheads’ true loyalties lay 
“down in Secessia,” and incessantly declared this wing and all other Democrats as traitors 
and rebels, save those who had converted, like James Lewis, or defected with Matthew 
Carpenter. Carpenter himself added fuel to these charges in an Assembly Chamber 
speech on October 31
st
 –covered at length by the ardently Republican Milwaukee 
Sentinel—denouncing the Democrats’ continuous kowtowing to the South throughout the 
1850s, and defending the Emancipation Proclamation and military arrests as necessary 
war measures.          
 Faced with this deluge of criticism, the Democrats responded with two strategies 
of their own: vitriolic ripostes in the press and on the stump to all denigration, and 
carefully worded defense or omissions of the more problematic issues. As they had in 
April, party orators and editors emphasized the bias and alleged unconstitutionality of the 
Enrollment Act, particularly the $300 provision, stating that such legislation only 
sacrificed working-class white men in what were ultimately futile, sanguinary battles led 
by incompetent generals. Further critiques were made of the soldier-vote bill as well, 
which the Democrats believed had been altered to bring about a favorable verdict in the 
Chandler case, and which they rightly feared would give the Republicans a decisive 
advantage that November. The familiar arguments against emancipation and the 
overreach of federal powers were also employed once again, with little abuse spared in 
the press. The more virulent writers turned the accusations of treason around and pointed 
them squarely at Lincoln, alleging that his Presidency had been the cause and prolonging 
factor of the war. “Abraham Lincoln is the traitor,” asserted “Brick” Pomeroy. “It is he 
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who has warred upon the Constitution. We have not…He has broken his oath—let 
himself to corruptionists and fanatics…”65      
 On the military effort, the Wisconsin Democrats had fewer options, and less 
likelihood of successfully turning their audiences. Gettysburg and Vicksburg went either 
unmentioned or moderated; even if such victories were significant, Democrats argued, 
more like them would destroy or permanently cripple the country, with no other value to 
the families of those who perished than adding their names to the casualty lists. The 
wartime prosperity they dismissed as paltry compared to that enjoyed prior to 1860, and 
little or no comfort to those who had and were suffering and dying at the fronts in the 
East, Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley.      
 In the final event, these arguments proved futile. After the last ballots had been 
counted, it was clear that James Lewis would succeed Salomon, with an initial majority 
of 14,000, and a total of almost 25,000 once the votes from the battlefield were tallied; it 
was later determined that out of every fifteen votes cast by soldiers, fourteen had gone for 
Lewis. In the Legislature, the Republicans had increased their control to 75 of 100 seats 
in the Assembly, and 23 out of 33 in the Senate. On the federal level, Edward Ryan had 
been denied the US Senate seat.       
 These defeats rocked the Democrats to their core. In an interesting reflection of 
the divisions between moderates and Copperheads over policy, the party’s delegates now 
broke into separate camps over the reasons for their loss. Some grouped under the belief 
that Carpenter and the “bolters” were to blame, believing they had broken the party out of 
blind subservience to the government, and had never been true Democrats at heart. 
Others believed coercion had taken place, whether among the home voters or the 
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battlefield units; the soldier-vote apparatus was subjected to a new round of attacks. The 
likeliest explanations—Gettysburg and Vicksburg, better prices and fatter purses, the 
appeal of Union and the effective “traitor” rhetoric—were largely ignored in this soul-
searching.           
 Even while hotly debating their losses, however, the Democrats could not deny 
that they had lost, and by much more than they had remotely feared. Gradually, they 
came to accept that the break between the War and Peace branches had been the primary 
contributor to their defeat in 1863, as it had threatened to do in the elections of 1861 and 
the previous year. The Democratic Party would still remain a viable opposition—the war 
events in the coming year would, for a time, give them considerable renewed support and 
even a realistic chance of taking the White House—but the era of internal unity was past. 
The moderates would remain distant from their more extremist colleagues, having been 
swayed to the “Union” cause, and the “Copperheads” would likewise remain entrenched 
in their hostility to these and any other parties they deemed destructive of the goals of 
peace and reunion at any price that they sought. 
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Chapter 4 
Ebbing Tide: Early 1864—Early 1865 
I. 
“The interests, the hopes and fears of millions now hang trembling in the balance, and the position 
of our State may turn the scale[…] Wisconsin is now standing side by side with all the Free States in 
support of the General Government; in support of law and order; in support of freedom.” 
--Gov. James T. Lewis, Jan. 14
th
, 1864 
 
In January of 1864, Governor Salomon formally handed over his office to his 
party’s chosen successor, James Taylor Lewis, and retired to his law practice in 
Milwaukee. Although “Boss” Keyes and the Madison branch had been careful to publicly 
applaud his efforts on behalf of Wisconsin and the Union—especially the soldier vote 
law that had proved so decisive in many contests—during his abbreviated term, there was 
little love lost between the ex-governor and much of his own party. In Keyes’ view, the 
Wisconsin Republicans had replaced a liability that had threatened to cost them state 
control; in Salomon’s, he had been unjustly cast aside thanks to unwarranted fears and 
back-room strong-arming. For the rest of the war, and until his departure for New York 
City in 1868 after a failed bid for a Senate nomination, Edward Salomon remained 
disillusioned and bitter over his treatment by Keyes.      
 In contrast, the party’s relationship with Lewis appeared solid and healthy. 
Originally from Clarendon, New York, the new governor had moved to Portage 
(Columbia) County, Wisconsin in 1845, where he had married and established a law 
practice, often speculating in land to great reward. After stints as a county judge and 
district attorney, he entered the State Assembly and then the Senate in 1852, before he 
was chosen as lieutenant governor the following year, departing this role in 1856 for a 
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brief return to the law. When the Civil War broke out, Lewis, originally a staunch 
Democrat, abandoned this party for the Republicans, who rewarded him with the office 
of Secretary of State in accordance with the “Union Party” tactic that would prove so 
effective in later elections.          
 During this campaign, the Democrats and a number of Republicans asserted that 
Lewis was driven solely by opportunity, seeking to cast his lot with whichever party 
promised the most reward and seemed guaranteed to remain in power, and lacked any 
real qualification for the post. His backers countered with the claim that their party, 
which had arisen largely from the wreckage of the pro-business Whigs, was the mecca 
for all persons who sought to improve the state, the nation and themselves through such 
means, and not remain shackled to outdated ideology such as that espoused by the still-
divided Democrats. Whatever his true motivations, it is a fact that Lewis was a 
consummate politician, capable of gaining the trust and support of colleagues on either 
side of the aisle, and of charting his own course on policy matters. In addition, he 
retained substantial wealth from his land business days, which had ensured from the start 
of his political career that he would remain mostly aloof from any dealings that might 
result in corruption, favoritism, or accusations thereof.     
 On January 14, 1864, Governor Lewis made his first speech to the joint houses of 
the Wisconsin Legislature. He began by highlighting the many benefits the state had 
reaped during the war years, in comparison with the depredations visited upon the South 
and the border states—a healthy home front population, higher prices for its goods, and a 
general peace among all citizens. After a brief summary of planned war debt payments, 
concerns over alleged irregularities in the soldier votes, and reorganization of the state’s 
militia, Lewis closed with a fierce denunciation of the Southern rebels, highlighting their 
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machinations throughout the entire history of the nation that had led to the present 
rebellion. His last remarks made it clear that he intended to continue the state’s 
contributions to the war effort, no matter the length or cost, and scorned any thought of 
peace overtures: 
“If our fathers were patriots in establishing this Government, we certainly cannot 
be far wrong in maintaining it. Believing then, as we sincerely do, that the government is 
in the right, that it is fighting in a holy and just cause, that duty demands of us action and 
sacrifice in its behalf, that efforts to patch up a temporary peace or obtain it by 
concessions to traitors, are not only dishonorable, but tend to protract the war and make it 
more expensive and dangerous—we hope to see Wisconsin unite all her energies, without 
distinction of party or sect, in prosecuting the war with the utmost vigor. Let us sustain 
the government and prosecute the war with a will and determination that shall carry the 
conviction to the minds of traitors, that obedience to the legally constituted authorities is 
the only course left to them; that our Government must be respected. The Union must 
stand, and we shall soon see the principles of liberty and equality re-established in every 
part of our National domain, firm as the rock of ages, there to stand a blessing to the 
world, an enduring monument of the fidelity and patriotism of those noble men of the 
Revolution who founded, and the noble patriots who now defend it.”66 
 
 It would not be long before Lewis’s rhetoric demanded action. One of the first 
concerns that confronted his office came on February 1
st
, in the form of yet another 
recruitment call from President Lincoln, this time for 500,000 soldiers, raised by any and 
all possible means. And this was just the first of many such drives that year; by 
December of 1864, an overall total of 1.5 million men would be called to the colors, 
largely thanks to the appalling losses in General Grant’s campaign towards Richmond, 
and similar casualties in Sherman’s drive through Tennessee in the direction of Atlanta. 
Thus Lewis had to manage renewed calls for volunteers along with keeping those units 
already in the field at full strength—which, despite federal control of the bureaucratic 
process, still remained a cumbersome and disliked war measure—and maintaining public 
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support for the draft.          
 None of these tasks were fully accomplished during that year. As Salomon had 
often done, Lewis frequently wrestled with Secretary of War Stanton over the fairest 
quota of troops for the state, as well as credits for those already raised. And though in 
early spring the Wisconsin governor had managed, along with his colleagues in Indiana, 
Illinois and Iowa, to convince Lincoln to raise significant numbers of hundred-day 
volunteers to serve as garrison troops while veteran units were freed to launch the hoped-
for final offensives, there were significant problems filling the number of required units. 
In the matter of those drafted, the state’s Adjutant General, Augustus Gaylord, estimated 
that barely 3,500 men entered the service—out of more than 17,500 called during the 
entire year—while roughly 7,400 had never reported for duty, and another estimated 
6,700 had been medically disqualified; a poor showing for an administration so keen on 
demonstrating its devotion to the Union cause.
67
      
 To the Democratic opposition, these shortfalls and mishaps provided much-
needed fodder, especially following their electoral shellacking the previous November, 
Campaigning for the Presidential election that fall had in fact started within days of 
Lewis’s inaugural speech, when the Republican members of the Legislature introduced 
resolutions endorsing Lincoln’s reelection, declaring the state’s full support for his 
wartime policies, and praising his leadership overall. With Minority Leader and former 
Attorney General George Smith as their primary voice, the Democrats attacked every one 
of these resolutions, claiming that the state was in fact much more divided on or outright 
opposed to Lincoln’s re-nomination. They also pointed once again to the military arrests 
and trials of civilians as proof of the President’s repeated violations of the Constitution, 
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regardless of whatever legitimization was passed by Congress, and asserted their role as 
the “true defenders” of this document. Thus, although the resolutions were easily passed 
by the heavily pro-Lincoln Legislature, its Democratic members had made their goals 
patently clear: the safeguarding of “their liberties and the Constitution at all hazards.”68 
 As spring of 1864 came and went, it appeared more and more likely that the 
Democrats’ stance and criticisms would be vindicated. By the end of May, both of the 
Union’s most-heralded offensives—Grant in Virginia, and Sherman in Tennessee—had 
not only failed to reach their goals of Richmond and Atlanta, respectively, but had done 
so at gruesome cost: in Grant’s case, more than 60,000 dead, wounded or missing from 
the Army of the Potomac—which included many Wisconsin units, particularly the famed 
Iron Brigade—in barely a month’s time, nearly equal to that force’s total losses in three 
years of fighting.
69
 Editors and politicians across the North laid the blame for these losses 
squarely at Grant’s feet, and by extension the Lincoln administration that had raised him 
to commander-in-chief of all Union armies. Though the peace plank championed by 
Ryan had been a disastrous blunder in the previous year’s elections, a number of 
Democrats began to reconsider this motion in light of such press, gambling that the war 
effort would remain stalled or otherwise calamitous long enough for support for the plank 
to rise and to be accepted at the party’s national convention later in 1864.  
 There were promising signs from the Republicans as well, at least in the initial 
months of the year. While George Smith and his colleagues in the Legislature were 
attacking the resolutions supporting Lincoln, they had received word through the press 
and official declarations that the Radical branch of the Republican Party was in fact 
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prepared to break with their moderate and conservative colleagues, and put forward either 
noted general and previous Presidential candidate John C. Fremont—who had gone so far 
as to enact emancipation in Missouri well ahead of Lincoln’s Proclamation, only to see 
this edict overruled by the President—or Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase, who had 
long criticized the slow pace of anti-slavery measures before and during Lincoln’s 
presidency, and had become a prominent ally of the Radicals.     
 Much to the Democrats’ elation, these speculations were confirmed on May 31st, 
1864, when the Radical Republicans formally nominated Fremont as their candidate, 
openly demonstrating their anger at the parent party’s failure to act or legislate in any 
determined manner on the slavery question, or to prosecute the war with satisfactory 
vigor. In the Democrats’ eyes, if this split lasted until November, and drew away 
sufficient numbers from the pro-Lincoln camp, the voters would likely tire of having to 
choose between such bitterly divided candidates, and  thus propel the Democratic choices 
for the White House and Congress into their seats with ease. With this in mind, the 
Democrats chose to wait to convene their national delegates until August, where they 
would also finally resolve their internal debates as to a suitable candidate.   
 However, the benefits expected from the Republicans’ disarray would prove 
illusory. In mid-1863, Alexander Randall had returned from his posting in Rome, and 
been selected as assistant Postmaster-General. During the first months of his 
appointment, however, he focused primarily on ensuring strong ties between the 
Wisconsin Republicans and the Lincoln administration, in order to avoid defections to the 
Radical wing, or worse, the Democrats. Due to such efforts, the pro-Lincoln measures on 
January 1864 passed with considerably more backing than had been previously 
expected—and this was only the beginning. The following month, using the authority and 
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connections of his office, Randall chose “Boss” Keyes as a “special commissioner,” with 
instructions to stump for Lincoln across the state, drawing in both wavering Republican 
and independent voters, and suppress any support for the still-unreconciled Radical 
ticket.            
 On March 30
th
, building on the success of this campaign, the state Republicans 
convened under the “Union Party” banner in Madison, selecting sixteen delegates for the 
national convention in Baltimore, with every one of these delegates affirming their 
support for the Lincoln-Johnson ticket.
70
 When the National Union Party convened on 
June 7
th, Lincoln’s re-nomination—and the end of Democratic hopes for another 
Republican split—were confirmed. Although the Radicals under Fremont would not 
officially abandon their campaign until later in the season, the Republicans were in effect 
a united party once again.        
 This new concern was much on the minds of the Wisconsin Democrats as they 
met with colleagues from the other Northern states in Chicago, on August 29
th
. By mid-
1864, two candidates had emerged as front-runners for the nomination: two-term former 
New York Governor Horatio Seymour, and General George B. McClellan, de facto 
retired from active duty after Antietam. To the ardent peace wing of the party, Seymour 
was the better choice; he had been a steadfast opponent of Lincoln’s wartime policies, 
particularly conscription, the introduction of “greenback” paper money and 
emancipation, from their inception, and had held this position without the use of vitriolic 
editorial or public rhetoric that had cost the “Peace Democrats” so much credibility in 
recent elections. In the view of the majority, however, McClellan was seen as a much 
more favorable option; his professed commitment to reunion along traditional, 
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constitutional lines (while remaining silent on the issues surrounding slavery), and the 
perception that his service to the Union had been hindered and curtailed by an 
administration in the grip of the Radicals, combined to create the image of the ideal 
wartime candidate.        
 Though the Wisconsin Democrats had already declared their support for 
McClellan prior to the convention, the rest of the party was still hotly divided. During the 
first round of deliberations, the general’s nomination seemed assured. His supporters 
pointed to renewed public weariness and shock at the bloodily stalled campaigns in 
Virginia and Tennessee as proof that the nation longed for a President who would end the 
war swiftly, rather than fumbling so disastrously as Lincoln and his Radical-dominated 
administration had done. Furthermore, they argued, McClellan personally remained 
highly popular among the veterans of the Army of the Potomac—at that time stalled in a 
dismal, gruesome siege around Richmond and Petersburg—and other front-line units; 
with careful electioneering, this might finally turn the soldier vote to the Democrats. 
 With both of these advantages, alongside continued highlighting of the 
constitutional and social abuses by Lincoln’s government, the pro-McClellan delegates 
believed the White House would be theirs. Indeed, unknown to the convention, even 
Lincoln had conceded that a McClellan nomination would mean certain defeat in fall, and 
had arranged for his Cabinet to sign a pledge—referred to as a “blind Memorandum”—
several days prior to the delegates’ arrival in Chicago, which asserted that if the general 
were elected, Lincoln and the other Cabinet members would cooperate to restore the 
Union before the inauguration in March, “as he [McClellan] will have secured his 
election on such grounds that he could not possibly save it afterwards.
71” Privately, 
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Lincoln confessed that he believed he would “be beaten, and beaten badly” come 
November.          
 However, the party had in fact already doomed its candidacy from the outset. 
During the arguments shaping the election platform on the 29
th, the “Copperhead” peace 
delegates, under the sway of Clement Vallandigham (recently returned from his Southern 
exile, and purportedly involved in insurrectionary plans for the creation of a “Northwest 
Confederacy” from the Midwestern states), gained control of the resolutions committee. 
In the first deliberations over suitable campaign planks, five issues were favored above 
all:  
1) Respect for American rights at all levels—individual, state and Union.  
2) An end to federal interference—real and perceived—in state elections. 
3) A pledge of full support for all members of the armed forces if the Democrats 
regained Washington.  
4) A strong denunciation of the administration’s flawed and faulty policies towards 
Union POWs. 
5)  A pledge of total party loyalty to the Union.72      
However, when the committee presented its final list to the convention that afternoon, 
a sixth plank had been added, forced through by Vallandigham and his supporters over 
the misgivings and outright objections of the moderate members. Drawing heavily from 
the former Congressman’s own views, this plank outright declared the Lincoln 
administration’s effort to restore the Union by war an utter failure, and called for an 
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immediate “cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States.73” 
In short, the party was now asked to push for an armistice without conditions, and no 
guarantee of reunion—the same measure that had cost Edward Ryan and the Wisconsin 
Democrats so dearly.         
 When the planks were read out to the convention, the war Democrats immediately 
realized the danger of the “war failure” declaration. Even with a still-popular general as 
their candidate, they ran the risk not only of earning the oft-used labels of traitors or 
cowards, but, if the war effort turned the Union’s way, false prophets. Nonetheless, their 
worries would count for little if McClellan were not actually chosen; thus they focused 
their efforts on the nomination, with the hope that the platform could be remedied later. 
On August 30
th
, after much acrimonious debate between the Peace and War wings, the 
Democrats nominated McClellan on the second ballot with 202 votes, increased from 174 
after Seymour bowed out of the race. While this might have seemed a prime example of 
reconciliation, the war Democrats were grudgingly forced to accept Ohio Congressman 
George Pendleton as the nominee for Vice-President. Like Vallandigham, Pendleton was 
an ardent Peace Democrat, with strong ties to the “Copperheads,” and strongly opposed 
to continuing the war even if McClellan were victorious that fall.    
 Thus, with the convention and the war’s third summer drawing to a close, the 
Democratic Party found itself running a war candidate on a peace platform, gambling that 
the results of the war and public opinion would continue to favor their platform 
regardless of its flaws. With November’s arrival would come the final decision on the 
war’s outcome, the fate of the Union—and the vindication or discrediting of Democratic 
and popular opposition to the war in Wisconsin. 
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II. 
“The man who votes for Lincoln now is a traitor and murderer. He who pretending to war for, wars against 
the Constitution of our country is a traitor, and Lincoln is one of these men…And if he is elected to 
misgovern for another four years, we trust some bold hand will pierce his heart with dagger point for the 
public good.” 
--Marcus “Brick” Pomeroy, in his August 23rd, 1864 editorial “The Widow Maker of the 19th Century and 
Republican Candidate for the Presidency
74” 
 
As the Wisconsin delegates began returning home, electioneering began in 
earnest. Although neither the Governor’s seat nor any in the Legislature were contested in 
fall 1864, there were six Congressional seats on the line—divided evenly between 
Republicans and Democrats—in addition to the Presidential election. Perhaps due to this, 
and a general weariness towards elections and the war in general, the candidates and 
advocates for both parties found voter enthusiasm noticeably lacking in the final two 
months before the election. Regardless of how much effort was poured into the 
campaigns, there was scant indication, at least among the state’s populace, as to the likely 
popular response to the platforms of both parties. Ultimately, the contest would be 
decided by which planks seemed most in line with the public perception of the war, and 
the present administration.        
 For the Wisconsin and national Democrats, this meant reorganizing or recasting 
their platform almost from the moment the Chicago convention had ended. Within a 
week of his nomination, General McClellan, on the advice of friends and in the face of 
withdrawal threats from the Vallandigham-controlled peace wing, had repudiated the 
“war-failure” plank. In a September 8th letter to the nominating committee, he argued that 
“the reestablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the 
indispensable condition in any settlement,” and stated that he “could not look in the face 
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of my gallant comrades of the army and navy who have survived so many bloody battles, 
and tell them that their labors and the sacrifices of so many of our slain and wounded 
brethren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often 
periled our lives.”75 In effect, the general was playing the same reunion song as Lincoln 
and the Republicans, though without radical reforms in the areas of emancipation or 
constitutional authority.         
 The sentiments of the September letter immediately led to a storm of criticism 
from Vallandigham and the other Peace Democrats; by mid-month, the “arch-
Copperhead” would formally break with the McClellanites and other moderates within 
the party, and refuse to embark on any speaking tours or other efforts on behalf of the 
nominee. Although many of McClellan’s partisans in Wisconsin and elsewhere saw this 
as a godsend, it severely hampered the promotion of the other, more popular planks of the 
Democratic platform. Pledging full support for Union soldiers—on the field and in 
Confederate prison camps—was admirable, but only went so far given the similar slogans 
employed by the Republicans. Denunciations of federal abuses, whether in terms of 
elections, habeas corpus or official corruption, had strong potential sway, but could be 
countered by claims of voter fraud—real or fictional—on the part of Democrats, as well 
as by harking back to General McClellan’s 1861 order declaring the closure and arrest of 
the pro-secessionist Maryland legislature.  And the oath of complete loyalty to the Union 
had already come under heavy fire from Republican press and candidates due to 
Vallandigham’s past statements, and his—and other Peace Democrats’—rumored 
involvement with Southern agents to incite riots, Confederate prisoner escapes and 
possible uprisings across the North. When added to the lack of any clear postwar 
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reconstruction policy, and to their nominee’s own silence on the question of 
emancipation, these issues became an electoral millstone for the Democratic Party. 
 There was, however, one card that the Democrats could and did play, as 
frequently as possible: That of race. Even prior to the first shots at Fort Sumter, Lincoln 
had been careful to avoid any hint of endorsing emancipation in his public speaking 
tours, and even in private correspondence; nor did he give any outward hints of what his 
policies towards freed slaves might be if such a measure were enacted. Though this 
reticence was in part because his own opinions were still evolving, much of it was in fact 
due to his canny perception that the majority of Northern voters were in fact adamantly 
opposed to the idea of waging war to end slavery. Those who favored conflict to defeat 
the “Slave Power” largely did so out of general patriotic antagonism towards any faction 
that sought to break the Union, as well as personal anger at the planter class’s perceived 
undue wealth and influence over the rest of the nation, but this did not translate into 
widespread sympathy for blacks, slave or free. Indeed, the implied threat of 
emancipation—that freed blacks would inevitably migrate northward and force whites 
out of prime areas of employment—had often been trumpeted against the Republicans in 
1860, and might well have cost them the election had the Democrats not been badly 
divided. Thus, until his issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln largely 
ignored the calls for outright abolitionist actions from the Radical Republican wing of his 
party, and adhered to his pledge of waging war for Union alone.     
 Nonetheless, from the start of the war the Democrats had not hesitated to assert 
that Lincoln, under the sway of the Radicals, was in fact preparing to usher in the sort of 
calamitous economic shift in favor of blacks that they had warned against. Wisconsinites 
in particular had already seen elements of this argument in “Brick” Pomeroy’s 
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increasingly acerbic articles, and among leaders and editors of the immigrant 
communities, particularly Germans and Irish. Nor was the Democrats’ anti-black 
criticism limited to the economic sphere. In spring and summer of 1862, the Legislature 
had taken up debate on a bill allowing suffrage to Wisconsin’s black residents—which 
had been raised repeatedly since statehood in 1848—and another banning any further 
settlement by blacks by August 1
st
. Although both bills were eventually defeated, the 
latter was brought forth again in early 1863 by Democratic assemblyman Peter V. 
Deuster, who before his election the previous fall had made similar arguments in his 
German-language newspaper, as part of his warnings to immigrant workers of that 
culture. This bill too met with failure, yet its reintroduction was a clear sign of the level 
of antagonism towards emancipation and blacks in general on the part of many in 
Wisconsin and the Northern states.        
 In December of 1863, the Democrats tried a new version of race-based, anti-
Republican criticism designed to reach a much wider audience, both in Wisconsin and 
across the North. Created anonymously by two journalists on the staff of the ardently 
Democratic newspaper New York World, a pamphlet titled “Miscegenation: The Theory 
of the Blending of the Races, Applied to the White Man and the Negro” appeared on 
multiple New York City newsstands, and was mailed to locations and individuals 
throughout the North. Written in a tone that suggested its author was in fact a staunch 
abolitionist, the pamphlet called for “the blending of the various races of men,” claiming 
that mixed (or “miscegenetic”) groups had proven superior in every way to all others, and 
that the North should immediately enact policies which would allow such intermingling 
on a regular basis. As their primary bombshell, the writers put forward the idea that the 
first “blending” should be done between blacks and Irish—a suggestion certain to elicit 
86 
 
  
fierce and perhaps violent denial from the latter group towards it, and any party which 
they suspected of its authorship.
76
        
 Although they had broken most of their ties to the McClellan ticket, the 
“Copperhead” Democrats nonetheless seized on the argument of this pamphlet shortly 
after the convention, eagerly deploying its allegedly truthful contents in favor of the 
general’s campaign. By early fall of 1864, “miscegenation” had become just one of many 
frequently-used epithets to describe the intended outcome of Republican policy with 
regards to both North and South. With abolition, the “Copperheads” and even some 
moderate Democrats argued, not only would the jobs and livelihoods of whites be 
threatened by freed blacks, but their very existence as a race and culture would be diluted 
and mixed beyond recognition—all with the blessing of “King Abraham.” To this wing 
of the Democrats, the various wartime actions and legislation of the Republicans had 
culminated in a platform that, according to another widely-circulated pamphlet, consisted 
of “Subjugation—Emancipation—Confiscation—Domination—Annihilation—
Destruction, in order to produce—Miscegenation!”77      
 As the fall campaign season wore on, however, Democrats in Wisconsin and 
nationwide found that racially-based attacks, while certainly effective at raising the ire of 
the voters, ultimately did not garner widespread credence. McClellan himself did not 
endorse the tactic, nor did the party’s governing committee, and its proponents among the 
Copperheads could not find many backers outside their own wing. Furthermore, the 
Republicans were not responding in any way to the claim that the idea of 
“Miscegenation” had originated in their party, except to ridicule it on the stump and in 
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the press; an editor on the Chicago Tribune even managed to turn the issue into a weapon 
against the Democrats, stating that since their platform called for both the Union and the 
Constitution “as it was”—which included the slave states, the only places where 
miscegenation logically could exist—the voters thus had another reason to vote 
Republican. By the start of October, though still trotted out on the campaign trail as 
needed, this method was all but shelved.     
 Moreover, though both parties hurled ever-increasing amounts of abuse on the 
opposing candidate over the course of the campaign, the Democrats found themselves 
most often having to defend themselves rather than press home on the social, economic 
and military issues which most preoccupied the electorate. The most frequently employed 
charge by the Republicans was that of treason. By failing to condemn the rebellion 
outright, by calling for negotiations—which implied the Confederate government was a 
legitimate body—and advocating the Union’s restoration without any alteration in slavery 
or the power of the federal government over the states, the Democrats were proving 
themselves Confederate sympathizers, if not out-and-out traitors. “Vote as Jeff Davis 
would have you vote, and you will vote for McClellan. Vote as Vallandigham tells you to 
vote, and you will vote for McClellan…Vote as the Devil himself[,] will vote and you 
will vote for McClellan and Pendleton—or, to express it more correctly, for Pendleton 
and Jeff Davis,” the Sentinel opined.78 Similar assertions held that even if the southern 
states could somehow be brought back into the fold through negotiation, it would be an 
egregious slap in the face to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors who had 
served and the many who had perished thus far, and asked both Washington and 
Richmond, in effect, to ignore the wholesale devastation and economic ruin that had 
                                                          
78
 Sentinel 11.8.64, “Choose Partners” 
88 
 
  
accompanied the war’s progress at every stage. Above all, such a bargain would leave 
much of the Deep South—the heart of the “Slave Power”—untouched, thus allowing the 
rebellious states to reassert the control over national policy that they had enjoyed and 
exerted before 1860. Such a result would weaken the Union even more definitively than 
secession itself had yet done—and if negotiations failed, the country might again split 
apart into warring factions, becoming as unstable and prone to internal violence as South 
America or Mexico.
79
         
 By the end of October, however, the question of which party would oversee the 
end of the war had already become clear to a significant number of pundits and voters. As 
recently as August 5
th
, a Union flotilla under Admiral David Farragut had breached the 
defensive works around Mobile Bay, thus closing off one of the last free Confederate 
seaports. On September 2
nd
, after more than four months of siege by General Sherman’s 
army, the Confederates abandoned Atlanta, a key logistical and manufacturing center 
second only to Richmond. And though still mostly bogged down in trenches in front of 
Petersburg and Richmond, General Grant was daily forcing Lee to overstretch his 
exhausted, increasingly malnourished and ill-supplied Army of Northern Virginia in 
defense of the Confederate capital, while General Philip Sheridan continued his scorched-
earth tactics in the Shenandoah Valley, considered the “breadbasket of the Confederacy”. 
Victories such as these renewed hope among Wisconsinites and Northerners as a whole 
that the early wartime cry “On to Richmond!” would at last be fulfilled, and gave the lie 
to claims by Copperheads and McClellanites alike that the war was doomed to bloody 
stalemate for as long as Lincoln and the Republicans remained in office.   
 In addition, the hoped-for permanent split between the Radicals favoring John C. 
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Fremont and the more conservative pro-Lincoln Republicans had been mended in early 
September. Initially believing that such a breakaway ticket would garner significant 
support because of the hesitancy on Lincoln’s part towards emancipation, black suffrage 
and other key tenets of Radical policy, Fremont dreaded even more the ramifications of a 
McClellan victory, with his fears only increasing after the dominance of the Copperheads 
became clear through the “war-failure” plank. With this in mind, and despite his 
misgivings, Fremont withdrew from the race, in an arrangement that also removed the 
conservative Missouri Republican Montgomery Blair—much despised by the Radicals 
for his influence in the Cabinet and with Lincoln—from the position of Postmaster-
General. Therefore, as November 8
th
 drew closer, the Republicans presented a united 
front to the voters under the tried-and-tested “Union Party” umbrella, while the 
Democrats appeared muddled and divided, with no substantial policy goals beyond 
displacing Lincoln and his associates.      
 When Election Day arrived, the bulk of Wisconsin’s voters—and a similar 
number nationwide—showed themselves unmoved by the moderates’ assertions of 
federal abuses, the race-based attacks of the Copperheads, and the inflammatory 
proclamations of editors such as “Brick” Pomeroy. When the state’s results were fully 
counted, Lincoln had gained Wisconsin’s domestic vote by a substantial majority, 
(68,887 to McClellan’s 62, 586). Though the General had taken populous Milwaukee 
County by more than twice Lincoln’s vote, along with nearly all of eastern and 
southeastern Wisconsin for a total of twenty-two counties out of the state’s fifty-eight, it 
had not been enough.
80
          
 To make matters worse for the Democrats, Lincoln’s lead in the Badger State was 
                                                          
80
 “Wisconsin in the Civil War,” p. 122 
90 
 
  
soon increased to over 83,000 once the votes of its soldiers were tallied. They had also 
lost two of the three Congressional seats gained in 1862 (bringing the state’s delegation 
to one Democrat and five Republicans), and both the State Senate and Assembly 
remained firmly in Republican hands.
81
 Nationwide, Lincoln had won an uncontestable 
majority in the popular vote (2,218,388 to 1,812,807) and a near-landslide in the 
Electoral College, losing only Kentucky, Delaware, and McClellan’s home state of New 
Jersey for a total of 212 to 21. In Congress, the Republicans had won forty-six additional 
House seats, for a majority of 88-72, and six Senate seats, bringing their total to 39 over 
the Democrats’ 11.82           
 The mood and hopes of the voters were clear: they expected the war to end soon, 
and they had emphatically rejected, as one Union Party slogan had urged them not to, 
changing horses in midstream. The Democrats in Wisconsin and the North had employed 
nearly every conceivable tactic to sway the electorate, and they had been discredited. 
Even though they would soon manifest their antagonism to the rapidly-forming 
Reconstruction policies of the Administration and the new Congress, their role as 
wartime opposition was effectively over. 
III. 
“Peace again smiles upon us. The work of death has ceased. The authority of the Government has 
been fully established, and traitors who once defied it now bow in humble submission. The accursed 
institution of African slavery has perished. The Union established by our fathers, cemented anew by the 
blood of their patriot sons sends forth a brighter and a purer light to the oppressed of other lands. The 
people of our State have enjoyed the blessings of health and prosperity, and the privileges of education and 
Divine worship. Our territory has not been polluted by the tread of the invader. Our substance has been 
preserved.” 
--Gov. James T. Lewis, Proclamation of Thanksgiving, Oct. 28
th
, 1865 
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In the aftermath of the 1864 elections, Democrats in Wisconsin and nationwide 
presented a simultaneously aggrieved and weary front to the nation. Some delegates and 
editors resurrected the claims of corruption, threats and fraud as explanation for their 
party’s defeat—“the power of the sword and the purse,” as one Madison paper asserted.83 
The moderates, pro-McClellan and otherwise, placed the blame for the party’s divisions 
following the Chicago convention at the feet of Vallandigham and the Copperheads. 
Similar accusations were made against editors and speakers, such as Pomeroy, whom it 
was believed had pushed away independent and wavering voters with their hateful press 
and tactics.  Still others pointed to a lack of adequate electioneering among the front-line 
units and those on furlough as the main cause, asserting that turning the soldier vote and 
those of their families would have blunted Democratic losses, if not reversed them. 
 Nonetheless, the prevailing Democratic attitude was that they had been beaten, 
plain and simple, as a result of events at the front and among themselves. Resigning 
themselves to the minority position, and accepting that the war would soon end in Union 
victory regardless of the election results, the Democrats as a body began girding 
themselves for the certain legislative battles over postwar policy once the last 
engagements at the front had been fought and the transition to peace had begun.  
 In Wisconsin, as in many other states, these debates centered on Reconstruction 
policy. One particular element of this policy brought forth for debate was the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which formally codified the end to slavery envisioned in the Emancipation 
Proclamation: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Where the Emancipation Proclamation 
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had declared a selective end to slavery—allowing the institution to remain in the loyal 
border states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri while attacking its 
defenders in the Confederacy—the Thirteenth Amendment affirmed its demise in all 
American states and territories, regardless of their current status.    
 Although this amendment had first been passed in April of 1864 by a solid 
majority in the Senate, and gained a similar show of support in the House, the vote in the 
latter chamber had fallen short of the two-thirds required for passage, delaying such until 
January of 1865. The primary arguments against the amendment in this body had come 
from the now-diminished Democratic minority, whose objections originated from 
concerns regarding the legislation’s impact on states’ rights, or that of the possibility of 
freed blacks becoming citizens as a result of its passage—a concept anathema to much of 
this party, and even certain factions within Lincoln’s own. The Republicans had 
countered with assertions that the amendment would not only eliminate the black mark of 
slavery, but would also restore other constitutional rights—such as the First 
Amendment—which had been hampered or outright suppressed in the antebellum South, 
and would promote economic equality among both whites and freed blacks once the 
plantation economy was ended.       
 On January 31
st
, the Thirteenth Amendment was passed by a narrow two-thirds 
vote of 119-56, signed by Lincoln the following day, and sent out for the states—those of 
the North, as well as Unionist-formed Reconstruction governments in Louisiana and 
northern Virginia—to approve. When the amendment arrived in Madison in early 
February, Governor Lewis at once urged the legislators to approve its passage: 
“Upon its adoption hangs the destiny of nearly four millions of human beings and 
it may be the destiny of the nation.  I trust, and doubt not, that the Legislature of 
93 
 
  
Wisconsin will record its decision firmly, and I hope unanimously in favor of the 
amendment. Let us wipe from our escutcheon the foul blot of human slavery, and show 
by our action that we are worthy the name of freemen.”84 
 
Thus, on February 24
th
, the Wisconsin Legislature ratified the amendment, 
becoming one of fifteen states to do so within a month’s time. While other states, both 
North and South, would prove dilatory towards ratification to varying degrees (in the case 
of Mississippi, Delaware and Kentucky, until the early to late 20
th
 century), Wisconsin’s 
Republican-controlled state government—demonstrated few or no qualms over bringing 
about a swift end to slavery. There were still pressing questions as to the rights and 
ultimate future of blacks within the state and the nation, but the most prominent barrier 
had been eliminated.         
 Meanwhile, as the legislators in Madison and Washington debated, the war was 
entering its final months. Such an outcome would not be long in arriving. On November 
15
th
, 1864, General Sherman had set out on his “March to the Sea” from Atlanta, aimed 
towards the port of Savannah and ignoring a desperate invasion of Tennessee by 
Confederate general Hood. Within a month’s time, Hood’s army had been decisively 
broken after pitched battles outside Franklin and Nashville, and Sherman’s men were 
nearing the coast. On December 21
st
, the Union general had jubilantly wired Lincoln: “I 
beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the City of Savannah, ” and soon turned his army 
northward, aiming for the Carolinas and the Confederate Army of the South under Joseph 
Johnston, the last sizeable Southern force in the Eastern theater other than Lee’s in 
Virginia. Over the course of winter 1864-1865, Sherman pursued this army from 
Savannah to Raleigh, North Carolina, retaking Charleston (the birthplace of the war) and 
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burning the South Carolina capital at Columbia along the way, while in Virginia Grant 
tightened the siege lines around Lee ever tighter. These events convinced the Northern 
public all the more that the war was near to ending, and gave greater impetus to debates 
over the nature of the peace.         
 On April 2
nd
, 1865, after blocking a desperate breakout attack by Lee one week 
earlier, General Grant’s army broke through the Confederate lines outside Petersburg, 
forcing the surrender of that city by dawn the next day. By evening, Richmond—
evacuated and largely gutted by fires set in the armories and warehouses by local 
militia—was likewise in Union hands, with the Stars and Stripes flying over Capital 
Square for the first time in almost four years. Six days later, after a tense, often bloody 
chase westward, General Lee surrendered what remained of the Army of Northern 
Virginia at Appomattox Courthouse.       
 Word of this succession of victories provoked great joy and approval among 
Wisconsinites of all strata. There was particular satisfaction among avowedly Republican 
voters and legislators, who saw themselves and their policies—social, economic, and 
ideological—vindicated after four years and more of often violent discord between 
themselves and the Democrats, and even between elements of their party. This sense of 
jubilation and justification was further made clear in Governor Lewis’s April 12th 
proclamation of thanksgiving, two days after receiving word of Appomattox: 
“The God of battles has again crowned our arms with victory. Under his guidance 
our brave soldiers are ‘marching on’ from conquest to conquest.     
 Richmond has fallen! The rebel army that held it in defiance of national authority, 
has been destroyed. The national honor has been vindicated, and peace and a restored 
Union, with all their countless blessings, are smiling through the clouds which have for 
the past four years surrounded us. Never before had a people such reason for rejoicing, 
such grand results to inspire them.       
 For all these blessings our thanks and praises are due to our Heavenly Father. We 
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should with grateful hearts recognize the power, wisdom and goodness of Him who gave 
us the victory, and bow in humble submission to His will […] And in our praises and 
rejoicings, may we not forget ‘Father Abraham’, who, in the goodness of his heart, to the 
downtrodden hath said: ‘The year of jubilee has come,’ and to the deluded followers of 
Lee and Davis; ‘Return ye ransomed sinners home.’”85 
 
With these words, the Governor outlined the then-prevalent hopes among 
Republicans and much of the North for reconciliation and rebuilding, with all citizens—
white and black—combining in such efforts. While certain elements of the defeated 
Southern rebellion, such as its higher leadership and its more ardent citizen supporters, 
would likely face treason trials, there would be no large-scale executions, and no bitter 
reprisals. The war appeared within days of ending in victory, and the time for reunion—
“with malice toward none, and charity for all”—was drawing ever nearer.   
 These lofty sentiments, however, would soon be turned on their head within five 
days’ time. On April 17th, Lewis was moved to issue another, very different 
proclamation:           
“It becomes my painful duty to announce to the people of this State the mournful 
and terrible intelligence of the death by assassination at Washington on the 15
th
 instant, of 
Abraham Lincoln, late Chief Magistrate of the nation.     
 “No event could have plunged the nation into more profound sorrow. A great and 
good man has fallen a victim to the wickedest rebellion the world has ever seen. The 
friend of the poor, the downtrodden and the lowly, the pride of the nation is no more. 
 “As a statesman his power was felt and acknowledged. His patriotism was 
unquestioned. His goodness of heart was proverbial. Because he was kind and good and 
loved his fellow men, because the people loved and delighted to honor him, hath the 
wicked slain him. Oh, Justice, why didst thou sleep!     
 “May this sad event, this terrible wrong, this great crime, arouse the nation to a 
true sense of the wickedness of those men who are seeking its destruction; arouse every 
true lover of his country to do or die for the Republic. Have we great and good men, look 
to see them die by the assassin’s knife. Have we the poor and feeble, look to see them 
made the slaves of wicked and inhuman masters, or prepare to defend and maintain the 
Union and assert the power and authority of the Government.”86 
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Wisconsin’s populace and parties became temporarily united in bereavement and 
grief over Lincoln’s death, as they had been during the first weeks after Fort Sumter. The 
Democrats adopted a stance as shocked, angry and sorrowful as the Republicans. 
Regardless of Ryan’s and others’ animosity towards the President, they condemned the 
assassination in the strongest terms, and, for a time, joined many of their opponents in 
calls for revenge against the Southern leadership and region as a whole. There was ample 
reason for such shows of unity. Despite Lee’s surrender, Johnston’s army and others still 
remained in the field across the crumbling Confederacy; Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet 
were still at large, exhorting continued rebellion as they moved south towards Georgia by 
whatever means available; and most importantly, the President’s killer, John Wilkes 
Booth, still eluded Federal capture. Moreover, the assassination had all but catapulted 
Lincoln into martyrdom, and elevated newcomer Vice-President and war Democrat 
Andrew Johnson to the Presidency—the first time such a transfer had taken place in a 
national crisis, and one that was still shrouded in procedural uncertainty. Therefore, 
strong shows of support by the Democrats became a necessity, if they were to avoid yet 
more charges of disloyalty, let alone remain intact as a party.     
 In accordance with Lewis’s recommendation, all of the state’s public buildings 
were draped in mourning for more than three months. Many newspapers lined their 
columns with black borders, and published glowing eulogies of the late President; even 
Pomeroy’s La Crosse Democrat did so, despite having gone so far as to write a proposed 
epitaph for Lincoln during the 1864 campaign:  
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“Beneath this turf the Widow Maker lies; Little in everything, except in size.”87  
In April 1865, the Democrats—in Wisconsin and elsewhere—could only look 
back on a wartime opposition that had proven virtually fruitless, and look forward to an 
uncertain immediate future. In Wisconsin itself, the party had called upon every 
conceivable tactic to gain or retain authority in the state—harkening to constitutional 
tradition, attacking federal policy, and appealing to race, culture or religion—yet they 
ended the Civil War with far less influence and in less favor than at its start. The 
Republicans would dominate Wisconsin’s politics until well into the 20th century, a 
prominence that began with the first postwar Governor, Lucius Fairchild, a retired 
brigadier general who had lost an arm at Gettysburg, and would go on to win three terms 
after election in November 1865—a first for the relatively new state, and one of the 
clearest examples of the voters’ long memories regarding the presumed association of the 
Democrats with the rebellion.         
 At the same time, victory for the Union did not yield all the fruits Republicans 
hoped for. Within months of gaining the Presidency, Andrew Johnson began to spar with 
both moderate and Radical members of this party over the nature and goals of 
Reconstruction. While the Republican rank-and-file, to varying degrees, favored 
draconian measures—military occupation, disenfranchisement of pro-secession 
Southerners, full civil rights and land ownership for freed blacks, and loyalty oaths sworn 
by a majority of a state’s population as a prerequisite for readmission—Johnson soon 
made clear his favoring of restoring the occupied Southern states to the Union as rapidly 
as possible, and proved disinterested in or openly hostile towards the programs intended 
to aid ex-slaves. Within a year, he would be at loggerheads with much of his own party 
                                                          
87
 La Crosse Democrat, Aug. 23
rd
, 1864 
98 
 
  
over civil rights legislation, arguing that such acts favored blacks over whites and fell 
under the purview of state governments—the same arguments utilized by Democrats in 
Wisconsin and elsewhere during the wartime period.    
 For Wisconsin, this internal schism had been clear since the first postwar 
elections. Though the Republicans still controlled the governorship, Legislature, Supreme 
Court and Congressional delegations, this was largely due to their reputation as the party 
that had preserved the Union, and having made alliances with War Democrats such as 
James Lewis and Matthew Carpenter. Even if the voters held them in greater esteem due 
to the North’s victory, there remained serious division and antagonism over the final 
results of that triumph, and their impact upon the state. During the fall 1865 campaign for 
governor, the Republicans initially appeared unassailable. With his wartime reputation 
and his calls for pensions, hospitals and other disability benefits for returning Wisconsin 
soldiers, Lucius Fairchild was highly popular with the state’s voters.88 On the harder 
Reconstruction questions, specifically black suffrage and Southern occupation, his 
position was much less certain. The Democrats, explicitly opposing suffrage expansion, 
challenged Fairchild to defend such in debate with their candidate—Harrison Hobart, 
another soldier and hero—gambling that the civilian and veteran voters would desert in 
droves if the Republican candidate did so. Choosing to demur publicly, Fairchild made 
his support clear in private correspondence to the Radical party members, disdaining calls 
by moderates such as Senator Doolittle to drop the issue.      
 Ultimately, this strategy gained Fairchild the governorship by 10,000 votes, but 
caused the defeat of black suffrage in referendum by almost 9,000. Reflecting past 
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elections, Milwaukee and much of the heavily Democratic southeastern areas had gone 
both against him and the suffrage proposal, while in certain other instances—such as in 
Dane County—Fairchild carried the vote while the referendum failed.89 In an apparent 
vindication for the Democrats, the Wisconsin soldier vote—nearly 1,500 men were still 
in the field by this period—had gone overwhelmingly for Fairchild (1,169 to 330), but 
had come down against suffrage by the same margin.
90
      
 This rejection rattled the Wisconsin Republicans, and increased the overall party’s 
dislike of Johnson.  From the start of his term, the President had encouraged state 
governments to decide black civil rights rather than Congress or the Executive Branch, 
but had actively opposed any results that encoded such rights. Wisconsin Democrats had 
failed to gain the governorship or a greater share of the Legislature, but the level of 
popular opposition to Republican Reconstruction policies, Radical and moderate, had 
been made plain. The question of suffrage for the state’s several hundred blacks was 
eventually decided the following year, in the case Gillespie v Palmer et al, which held 
that suffrage had been in effect since a similar 1849 proposition (despite only one-sixth of 
the votes having been in favor).
91
 Even so, the black vote was of small immediate benefit 
to the Wisconsin Republicans, provided ample fodder for Democratic charges of their 
having surrendered to “niggerism,” and discredited a keystone element of national 
Reconstruction policy before it had been fully debated or implemented.   
 Nor was the opposition solely external. During the Republican state convention in 
September, the divisions between the Radical-leaning delegates and those favoring 
Johnson had widened when the President secured the support of now-Postmaster General 
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Alexander Randall, “Boss” Keyes, and Senator Doolittle. The latter pushed resolutions 
endorsing the President’s program for speedy re-admittance of the South, which he 
believed would aid in retaining War Democrats who had already voted down a proposal 
for Negro suffrage in the former Confederacy. As a result, when Johnson and Congress 
began to wrangle in earnest over Reconstruction policy following the November 
elections, the Radicals in Wisconsin joined ranks in opposition to the President; only 
Senator Doolittle and Congressman Charles Eldredge—the sole remaining Democrat in 
Wisconsin’s delegation—stood in support. In March of 1866, when Johnson vetoed bills 
providing for the creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau and the establishment of basic black 
civil rights, the Wisconsin Republicans—save for Doolittle, Keyes, Randall, and 
Milwaukee banking magnate Alexander Mitchell—voted alongside their national 
colleagues to override the veto, the first ever such act in American history. In May of that 
same year, a further blow came to Wisconsin and national Republicans in the form of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Milligan. In its judgment, the Court ruled that 
while the suspension of habeas corpus had been lawful due to the Congressional Act 
passed in 1863, the trial of civilians by military courts—as in the matter of Nicholas 
Kemp and the other Port Washington rioters—was unconstitutional in areas where 
civilian courts remained open. Furthermore, the Court held that individuals could only be 
held without charges. Trials and executions were prohibited, even in situations where 
military officials received federal authorization to detain civilians for undetermined 
periods. This decision undercut a core aspect of the erstwhile Lincoln Administration’s 
wartime policy, and further threatened the Republican’s image as the virtuous party of 
victory.          
 These continuing duels of legislation and rulings, as well as general Republican 
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fears of increased Southern (i.e. Democratic) presence in Congress under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, even with the implementation of black civil rights, led in turn to proposals 
for the Fourteenth Amendment. Under its tenets, all male citizens born within the United 
States, regardless of race, would be guaranteed voting rights; state governments were 
prohibited from infringing upon this right in any form; and any citizens seeking to attain 
state or federal office after having participated in rebellion against the United States 
would be barred from election—in short, three of the most sought-after policy goals of 
the Radical Republicans.        
 By June 1866, when the proposed 14
th
 Amendment had been sent to the states for 
ratification, Johnson had effectively lost all backing among Republicans in Wisconsin—
and earned significant yet embarrassing support from the Democrats, who lauded his 
aims of a swift end to the Southern occupation, state control of civil rights and other 
altered Reconstruction policies. As the 1866 midterms drew near, the state Republican 
leaders redoubled their efforts to bring the disparate moderate and Radical factions 
together, and sought to increase the trickle of “Union Party” defectors from the 
Democrats. In the case of the latter strategy, the most obvious target was the refusal of 
nearly every former Confederate state—save Tennessee, Johnson’s birthplace—to ratify 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Republican papers such as the Milwaukee Sentinel cast the 
President and Senator Doolittle as traitors encouraging the South’s continuing disloyalty, 
and called for the state’s voters to reject such unpatriotic men and actions.92  
 The final results of 1866 reflected the impact these exhortations had on a still war-
weary public suspicious of Southern reconciliation. The Republicans gained twelve 
additional seats in the Legislature, bringing their majority to fifty-nine, and all five 
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Congressmen adhering to this party were reelected. When the new Legislature opened in 
January of the following year, Governor Fairchild eloquently urged the delegates to ratify 
the Fourteenth Amendment at once, declaring the election results a clear mandate for 
such from the public, and indicative of Wisconsin and the North’s responsibility to both 
defend freed blacks and loyal Southerners, and to safeguard against a resurgence of 
rebellion: 
“In my opinion, it is the duty of Congress, the only remaining hope of loyalty and 
justice at the South, to provide for the future establishment of local governments over 
those portions of the South lately in rebellion, which have refused their assent to this 
amendment, such governments to be based upon impartial, loyal suffrage. In this I 
advocate no disregard of the Constitution. I yield to no man in my reverence for that 
instrument. The fact that illegal local governments have been in operation there sense the 
cessation of hostilities, forms no bar to the right of Congress to establish legal ones. Let 
Congress act, and the loyal people will sustain it, be the consequences what they may. No 
other course will settle our troubles beyond the possibility of a recurrence, and insure 
justice to the Unionists of that section. The safety of our country and the fulfillment of 
our pledges alike demand it. We have pledged our honor that we would stand by and 
protect those who were loyal at the South during the struggle just ended. It were better to 
have failed in the contest, than now to coldly turn our backs upon those who were 
‘faithful found among the faithless’. We should deserve to be wiped out from among the 
nations of the earth did we do this.        
 “I am firm in the faith that with proper action on the part of Congress, the day of 
settlement is at hand. Let the people stand fast in the position they have taken, and it must 
soon come. Would that my voice could reach all loyal men in the land, to tell them to be 
of good cheer, for the day is not far distant when our beloved country will be, in all its 
sections, a land of freedom in fact as well as in name; free in speech, free in press, and 
free in ballot. May God speed the coming of that happy day!”93 
 
On February 13
th
, the Amendment passed both houses by a safe majority, thus 
making Wisconsin the twentieth ratifying state. Though the final form of the proposal 
was in some ways unsatisfactory to the Radical Republicans—which would lead to their 
push for the Fifteenth Amendment within two years—their tenacity on the civil rights and 
general Reconstruction platforms, in the face of obstruction from the Democrats, the 
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defeated South and their pro-Johnson colleagues, had been vindicated.  
 In the end, this chain of success would prove potent yet brief. Johnson would be 
cast aside by his party in 1868 (in favor of war hero U.S. Grant) after narrowly avoiding 
impeachment, and his Wisconsin ally Doolittle would be replaced the next year by the 
War Democrat convert Matthew Carpenter; but these were short-term victories. By 1870, 
despite the Republicans (Radical and otherwise) maintaining their majority in both 
houses of Congress, and the expansion of black rights and federal control over the states 
through Reconstruction, the impulse for reform and “bloody-shirt”-inspired governance 
was waning fast. The Republican majorities in Wisconsin shrank with each successive 
election after 1866, prompting the party to all but abandon its focus on civil rights and 
promote expansion of railroads, canals and ports as the ideal form of Reconstruction for 
the state, with the assertion this stance would serve as a counter to a possible resurgent 
South bent on hindering the economic growth of the North through legislative 
stonewalling in Congress. This shift from morality to economics signaled a de facto end 
to the impact and importance of Union victory on Wisconsin’s various ethnic and 
political factions, and accelerated the decline of Reconstruction nationwide.   
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Conclusion 
Given their antagonism towards the social and economic impact of the Union’s 
primary wartime goals—reunion and emancipation—the support of Wisconsin’s citizens 
was contingent upon definitive victories at the front and extensive Republican politicking 
within the state itself. By appealing to constituents’ devotion to the still-abstract ideal of 
national Union during 1861 and 1862, the Republican Party in Wisconsin succeeded in 
swaying voters who would otherwise have staunchly opposed them on the grounds of the 
slavery question, or those of perceived constitutional abuses such as the habeas corpus 
suspension. Though the Democrats temporarily gained a greater voice in the Legislature 
and the Congressional delegation in 1862 by exploiting popular exhaustion with wartime 
losses, as well as discontent with the anticipated economic outcome of emancipation, the 
North’s rising military fortunes after Gettysburg and Atlanta reversed much of the 
popular resentment towards the Republican Party’s management of the war and the 
federal government. The draft process in particular would remain an unwieldy and 
unpopular measure, prone to corruption, shirking and bureaucratic incompetence, but 
there was no serious threat of popular revolt in Wisconsin following the Port Washington 
Riots, and even less in the war’s final two years.      
 Furthermore, regardless of their personal attitudes towards blacks, free or slave, a 
majority of Wisconsin voters after 1864 did not readily respond to the “miscegenation” 
and other race-based tactics employed by the Democrats and the Copperhead faction 
during this election year. The spreading perception of the war as a moral crusade against 
slavery temporarily came to outweigh private fears of abolition’s social and economic 
results, which had increased following the Emancipation Proclamation—even amongst 
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individuals who supported a restored Union sans slavery. In addition, the Republican 
tactic of casting those who criticized or openly opposed their policies as traitors served to 
further discredit the idea of rapprochement with the South without conditions, as 
espoused by Edward G. Ryan and other Wisconsin Peace Democrats in accordance with 
the national Democratic line post-1862. With the Northern armies steadily gaining 
ground after 1863, and with domestic military courts in place to judge and punish citizens 
deemed sympathetic to the Southern cause, “peace-at-any-price” rhetoric lost favor 
among Wisconsin voting blocs—such as the Irish and Germans—who had previously 
favored the Democratic Party on the basis of their opposition to abolition and other 
Republican policies following 1862.       
 When Wisconsinites objected to Republican Civil War policies—whether through 
ballots, speeches or riots—they did so out of fear of the impact of these policies on the 
societal fabric of their state: specifically, state and federal protection and favoring of 
banks, railroads and other industries to fund the war effort; the expanding of executive 
powers to manage the draft and punish real or imagined treason; and the formal ending of 
slavery, with its attendant costs due to the destruction of the plantation economy and the 
feared migration of blacks to Northern cities and jobs. The success of the Union military, 
combined with the Republicans’ political tactics at home, served in the end to quiet this 
dissent and bring about wider recognition of the benefits brought by Lincoln’s party. One 
conclusion is clear above all: The ongoing conflict over Republican programs, played out 
in Wisconsin, proved the importance of the state’s role in the Union’s war effort and 
restoration, and what shape that restoration would assume as the Civil War came to an 
end. 
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